This report reviews each setting in the provided Android Intune Compliance Policy JSON and evaluates whether it aligns with best practices for strong device security. For each setting, we explain its purpose, available configuration options, and why the chosen value is configured to maximize security. Overall, the policy enforces a defense-in-depth approach – requiring a strong unlock password, up-to-date system software, device encryption, and other controls – which closely follows industry security benchmarks[1]. The analysis below confirms that every configured setting reflects accepted best practices to protect Android devices and the sensitive data on them.
Password Security Requirements
Requiring a strong device PIN/password is fundamental to mobile security. This policy’s System Security section mandates a lock screen password with specific complexity rules. These settings are all considered best practice, as they greatly reduce the risk of unauthorized device access[2][3]:
Require Password to Unlock Device – Enabled (Require). This forces users to set a lock screen PIN/password. It is a baseline security best practice so that no device can be accessed without authentication[2]. Purpose: Ensures the device isn’t left unprotected. Options: “Not configured” (no requirement) or “Require” a password. Rationale: Marking this as “Require” is essential – devices must be password-protected to be considered compliant[2], which prevents unauthorized access to corporate data.
Required Password Type – Alphanumeric. This setting specifies the complexity of the password. Options range from numeric PINs to alphanumeric with symbols[4][5]. Requiring alphanumeric means the password must include letters (and usually numbers), not just digits, which significantly increases its strength[3]. Purpose: Enforce a complex password (as opposed to a simple PIN). Options: Numeric (digits only), Numeric complex (no simple patterns like 1234), Alphabetic (letters only), Alphanumeric (letters + numbers), or Alphanumeric with symbols[4]. Rationale:Alphanumeric passwords are far harder to crack than 4-digit PINs. Best practice from security audits is to require at least alphanumeric complexity[3], which this policy does. This ensures the device lock is not easily guessable.
Minimum Password Length – 6 characters. This sets the shortest allowed length for the PIN/password. Longer passwords are more secure. Intune allows 4–16; industry guidance recommends at least 5 or more characters[6]. The policy’s value of 6 exceeds the minimum recommendation, which is good for security (e.g. a 6-digit PIN has 1 million combinations versus 10,000 for 4-digit). Purpose: Prevent very short, trivial PINs. Options: 4–16. Rationale: A minimum length of 6 is aligned with best practices (Tenable recommends 5 or more for compliance)[6]. This length increases resistance to brute-force guessing while still being reasonable for users to remember.
Maximum Minutes of Inactivity Before Password is Required – 5 minutes. This setting (often called device auto-lock timeout) controls how quickly the device locks itself when idle. A low value means the device will require re-authentication sooner. Here it’s set to 5 minutes, which is in line with strict security guidelines (Tenable suggests 5 minutes or less)[7]. Purpose: Limit how long an unattended device stays unlocked. Options: Various minute values (1, 5, 15, etc.) or not configured. Rationale:5 minutes of inactivity before auto-lock is a best practice balance between security and usability[7]. It ensures a lost or idle device will secure itself quickly, minimizing the window for an attacker to pick it up and access data. Short timeouts greatly reduce risk if a user forgets to lock their phone.
Password Expiration (Days) – 90 days. This defines how often the user must change their device password. The policy requires a password change after 90 days (about 3 months). Regular rotation of passwords is a traditional security practice to limit exposure from any one credential. Purpose: Prevent use of the same password indefinitely. Options: 1–255 days, or not configured. Rationale:90 days is a commonly recommended maximum password age in many security standards[8]. Tenable’s best-practice audit recommends 90 days or fewer for mobile devices[8]. For strong security, forcing periodic changes can mitigate the impact if a password was unknowingly compromised – the window of misuse is limited. (Note: Some modern guidelines put less emphasis on frequent expiration in favor of complexity, but 90-day expiry is still widely used in compliance policies and thus is reasonable here.)
Password History (Prevent Reuse) – Last 5 passwords. This ensures the user cannot cycle back to recently used passwords when changing it. The policy likely prevents reuse of at least the previous 5 passwords (meaning the user must come up with 6 unique passwords before an old one can be used again). Purpose: Enforce password uniqueness across changes. Options: 1–24 previous passwords remembered (Intune allows up to 24). Rationale: Reusing old passwords defeats the purpose of expiration. Requiring a history of 5 or more past passwords not to be reused is recommended so users don’t just alternate between two favorites[4]. This policy’s setting aligns with that guidance. It forces truly new passwords at each reset, maintaining effective security over time.
Together, these password policies ensure the device has a robust lock screen defense: a nontrivial PIN/passcode that must be changed regularly and cannot be easily bypassed or guessed. This complies with industry best practices (for example, CIS Benchmarks and security auditors require a device lock PIN of sufficient length and complexity and short idle lock time)[1]. Enforcing these settings makes it far less likely for an unauthorized person to unlock a lost or stolen device and thereby protects the enterprise data on it.
Device Encryption
Requiring encryption of the device storage is another cornerstone of mobile security. This policy mandates encryption, meaning the data on the phone cannot be read without the device being unlocked. This is unequivocally a best practice for strong security:
Encryption of Data Storage on Device – Require. The compliance rule is set so that the device must be encrypted (usually, Android devices automatically encrypt when a PIN/password is set, so this goes hand-in-hand with the password requirement). Purpose: Protect data at rest by encryption, so that even if the device is stolen and its storage is removed, the data remains scrambled without the encryption key. Options: “Require” or “Not configured”. Rationale: Marking encryption as Required is considered an essential security baseline. Tenable’s audit specifies that “Encryption of data storage on device” should be set to Require[9]. This ensures that all sensitive information on the phone (emails, files, app data) is encrypted by the OS. In practice, this means an attacker can’t simply connect the device to a computer or remove its SD card to extract data – they would need the user’s passcode to decrypt it. Requiring encryption is a standard best practice and is enabled by default in this policy[9].
In summary, the policy’s encryption setting ensures data confidentiality even if physical device security fails. It aligns with strong security principles and most regulatory requirements (many frameworks mandate full-device encryption for mobile devices).
Device Security Settings (App Sources and Debugging)
The policy includes additional system security rules to prevent risky device configurations. These settings block the user from enabling sources or modes that could introduce malware or vulnerabilities, which is consistent with best practices for hardening Android devices:
Block Apps from Unknown Sources – Block (Enabled). This compliance check likely verifies that the device is not allowing app installations from outside the official app store. In other words, the user must not turn on the Android setting that permits installs from unknown sources. Purpose: Ensure only vetted apps (from Google Play or the managed Play Store) can be installed, reducing the risk of malware. Options: Not configured, or Block. Rationale:Blocking unknown sources is strongly recommended by security experts[10]. Sideloading apps (installing APK files from random websites or USB) bypasses app vetting and can lead to malware infections. The policy marks a device non-compliant if that setting is enabled, thus users are forced to keep it off (which is the secure state)[10]. This aligns with best practice to allow installs only from trusted app stores.
Block USB Debugging (Developer Mode) – Block (Enabled). This setting ensures that the device is not in Developer mode with USB debugging enabled. USB debugging is a developer feature that could be exploited to bypass certain security controls or install apps via USB. Purpose: Prevent the device from running in a state that is meant for development/testing, which could expose it to abuse. Options: Not configured, or Block. Rationale: **Blocking USB debugging is a known best
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Modern enterprises use Intune compliance policies to enforce best practice security settings on iPhones and iPads. The provided JSON defines an iOS compliance policy intended to ensure devices meet strong security standards. Below, we evaluate each setting in this policy, explain its purpose and options, and verify that it aligns with best practices for maximum security. We also discuss how these settings map to industry guidelines (like CIS benchmarks and Microsoft’s Zero Trust model) and the implications of deviating from them. Finally, we consider integration with other security measures and recommendations for maintaining the policy over time.
Key Security Controls in the Compliance Policy
The following sections break down each policy setting in detail, describing what it does, the available options, and why its configured value is considered a security best practice.
1. Managed Email Profile Requirement
Setting:Require managed email profile on the device.\ Policy Value:Required (Not Not Configured).\ Purpose & Options: This setting ensures that only an Intune-managed email account/profile is present on the device. If set to “Require”, the device is noncompliant unless the email account is deployed via Intune’s managed configuration[1]. The default Not configured option means any email setup is allowed (no compliance enforcement)[1]. By requiring a managed email profile, Intune can verify the corporate email account is set up with the proper security (enforced encryption, sync settings, etc.) and not tampered with by the user. If a user already added the email account manually, they must remove it and let Intune deploy it; otherwise the device is marked noncompliant[1].
Why it’s a Best Practice: Requiring a managed email profile protects corporate email data on the device. It prevents scenarios where a user might have a work email account configured outside of Intune’s control (which could bypass policies for encryption or remote wipe). With this requirement, IT can ensure the email account uses approved settings and can be wiped if the device is lost or compromised[1]. In short, it enforces secure configuration of the email app in line with company policy. Not using this setting (allowing unmanaged email) could lead to insecure email storage or difficulty revoking access in a breach. Making it required aligns with strong security practices, especially if email contains sensitive data.
Trade-offs: One consideration is user experience: if a user sets up email on their own before enrollment, Intune will flag the device until that profile is removed[1]. IT should educate users to let Intune handle email setup. In BYOD scenarios where employees prefer using native Mail app with personal settings, this requirement might seem intrusive. However, for maximum security of corporate email, this best practice is recommended. It follows the Zero Trust principle of only permitting managed, compliant apps for corporate data.
2. Device Health: Jailbreak Detection
Setting:Mark jailbroken (rooted) devices as compliant or not.\ Policy Value:Block (mark as not compliant if device is jailbroken)[1].\ Purpose & Options: This control checks if the iOS device is jailbroken (i.e., has been modified to remove Apple’s security restrictions). Options are Not configured (ignore jailbreak status) or Block (flag jailbroken devices as noncompliant)[1]. By blocking, Intune will consider any jailbroken device as noncompliant, preventing it from accessing company resources through Conditional Access. There’s no “allow” option – the default is simply not to evaluate, but best practice is to evaluate and block.
Why it’s a Best Practice:Jailbroken devices are high risk and should never be allowed in a secure environment[2]. Jailbreaking bypasses many of Apple’s built-in security controls (code signing, sandboxing, etc.), making the device more vulnerable to malware, data theft, and unauthorized access[2][2]. An attacker or the user could install apps from outside the App Store, escalate privileges, or disable security features on a jailbroken phone. By marking these devices noncompliant, Intune enforces a zero-tolerance policy for compromised devices – aligning with Zero Trust (“assume breach”) by treating them as untrusted[2]. Microsoft explicitly notes that jailbroken iOS devices “bypass built-in security controls, making them more vulnerable”[2]. This setting is easy to implement and has low user impact (legitimate users typically don’t jailbreak), but provides a big security payoff[2].
Allowing jailbroken devices (by not blocking) would be contrary to security best practices. Many security frameworks (CIS, NIST) recommend disallowing rooted/jailbroken devices on corporate networks. For example, the Microsoft 365 Government guidance includes ensuring no jailbroken devices can connect. In our policy, “Block” is absolutely a best practice, as it ensures compliance = device integrity. Any device that is detected as jailbroken will be stopped from accessing company data, protecting against threats that target weakened devices.
Additional Note: Intune’s detection is not foolproof against the latest jailbreak methods, but it catches common indicators. To improve detection (especially in iOS 16+), Location Services may be required (as noted by Microsoft Intune experts) – Intune can use location data to enhance jailbreak detection reliability. As part of maintaining this policy, ensure users have not disabled any phone settings that would hinder jailbreak checks (an Intune advisory suggests keeping certain system settings enabled for detection, though Intune prompts the user if needed).
Setting:Maximum allowed device threat level, as evaluated by a Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) service.\ Policy Value:Secured (No threats allowed) – if an MTD integration is in use.\ Purpose & Options: This setting works in conjunction with a Mobile Threat Defense solution (like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on iOS, or third-party MTD apps such as Lookout, MobileIron Threat Defense, etc.). It lets you choose the highest acceptable risk level reported by that threat detection service for the device to still be compliant[1]. The options typically are: Secured (no threats), Low, Medium, High, or Not configured[1]. For example, “Low” means the device can have only low-severity threats (as determined by MTD) and still be compliant, but anything medium or high would make it noncompliant[1]. “Secured” is the most stringent – it means any threat at all triggers noncompliance[1]. Not configured would ignore MTD signals entirely.
In the context of a strong security policy, setting this to Secured means even minor threats (low severity malware, suspicious apps, etc.) cause the device to be blocked[1]. This is indeed what our policy does, assuming an MTD is in place. (If no MTD service is connected to Intune, this setting wouldn’t apply; but the JSON likely has it set anticipating integration with something like Defender.)
Why it’s a Best Practice: Mobile Threat Defense adds dynamic security posture info that pure device settings can’t cover. By requiring a Secured threat level, the policy ensures that only devices with a completely clean bill of health (no detected threats) can access corporate data[1]. This is aligned with a high-security or “Level 3” compliance approach[3]. Microsoft’s High Security baseline for iOS specifically recommends requiring the device to be at the highest security threat level (Secured) if you have an MTD solution[3][3]. The rationale is that even “low” threats can represent footholds or unresolved issues that, in a highly targeted environment, could be exploited. For example, a sideloaded app flagged as low-risk adware might be harmless – or it might be a beachhead for a later attack. A Secured-only stance means any threat is unacceptable until remediated.
This stringent setting makes sense for organizations that prioritize security over convenience, especially those facing sophisticated threats. Users with malicious apps or malware must clean their device (usually the MTD app will instruct them to remove the threat) before they regain access. It’s a preventative control against mobile malware, man-in-the-middle attacks, OS exploits, etc., as identified by the MTD tool.
Options and Balance: Some organizations without an MTD solution leave this Not configured, which effectively ignores device threat level. While simpler, that misses an opportunity to enforce malware scanning compliance. Others might set it to Low or Medium to allow minor issues without disruption. However, for maximum security, “Secured” is ideal – it is explicitly called out in Microsoft’s level 3 (high security) recommendations[3]. It’s worth noting that using this setting requires deploying an MTD app on the devices (such as the Microsoft Defender app for Endpoint on iOS or a partner app). For our strong security baseline, it’s implied that such a solution is in place or planned, which is why Secured is chosen.
If not implemented: If your organization does not use any MTD/Defender for mobile, this setting would typically be left not configured in the policy (since there’s no data to evaluate). In that case, you rely on the other controls (like jailbreak detection, OS version, etc.) alone. But to truly maximize security, incorporating threat defense is recommended. Should you decide to integrate it later, this policy value can be enforced to immediately leverage it.
4. Device Properties: Minimum OS Version
Setting:Minimum iOS operating system version allowed.\ Policy Value:iOS 16.0 (for example) – i.e., devices must be on iOS 16.0 or above.\ Purpose & Options: This compliance rule sets the oldest OS version that is considered compliant. Any device running an iOS version lower than this minimum will be flagged as noncompliant[1]. The admin specifies a version string (e.g. “16.0”). Available options: you provide a version – or leave Not configured to not enforce a minimum[1][1]. When enforced, if a device is below the required version, Intune will prompt the user with instructions to update iOS and will block corporate access until they do[1]. This ensures devices aren’t running outdated iOS releases that may lack important security fixes.
Why it’s a Best Practice: Requiring a minimum OS version is crucial because older iOS versions can have known vulnerabilities. Apple regularly releases security updates for iOS; attackers often target issues that have been patched in newer releases. By setting (and updating) a minimum version, the organization essentially says “we don’t allow devices that haven’t applied critical updates from the last X months/year.” This particular policy uses iOS 16.0 as the baseline (assuming iOS 17 is current, this corresponds to “N-1”, one major version behind the latest)[3]. Microsoft’s guidance is to match the minimum to the earliest supported iOS version for Microsoft 365 apps, typically the last major version minus one[3]. For example, if iOS 17 is current, Microsoft 365 apps might support iOS 16 and above – so requiring at least 16.x is sensible[3]. In the JSON provided, the exact version might differ depending on when it was authored (e.g., if created when iOS 15 was current, it might require >= iOS 14). The principle remains: enforce updates.
This is absolutely a best practice for strong security. It’s reflected in frameworks like the CIS iOS Benchmark, which suggests devices should run the latest iOS or within one version of it (and definitely not run deprecated versions). By enforcing a minimum OS, devices with obsolete software (and thus unpatched vulnerabilities) are barred from corporate access. Users will have to upgrade their OS, which improves overall security posture across all devices.
Management Considerations: The admin should periodically raise this minimum as new iOS versions come out and older ones reach end-of-support or become insecure. For instance, if currently set to 16.0, once iOS 18 is released and proven stable, one might bump minimum to 17.0. Microsoft recommends tracking Apple’s security updates and adjusting the compliance rule accordingly[3][3]. Not doing so could eventually allow devices that are far behind on patches.
One challenge: older devices that cannot update to newer iOS will fall out of compliance. This is intended – such devices likely shouldn’t access sensitive data if they can’t be updated. However, it may require exceptions or phased enforcement if, say, some users have hardware stuck on an older version. In a maximum security mindset, those devices would ideally be replaced or not allowed for corporate use.
Maximum OS Version (Not Used): The policy JSON might also have fields for a Maximum OS Version, but in best-practice compliance this is often Not configured (or left empty) unless there’s a specific need to block newer versions. Maximum OS version is usually used to prevent devices from updating beyond a tested version—often for app compatibility reasons, not for security. It’s generally not a security best practice to block newer OS outright, since newer OS releases tend to improve security (except perhaps temporarily until your IT tests them). So likely, the JSON leaves osMaximumVersion unset (or uses it only in special scenarios). Our focus for strong security is on minimum version – ensuring updates are applied.
5. Device Properties: Minimum OS Build (Rapid Security Response)
Setting:Minimum allowed OS build number.\ Policy Value: Possibly set to enforce Rapid Security Response patches (or Not Configured).\ Purpose & Options: This lesser-used setting specifies the minimum iOS build number a device must have[1]. Apple’s Rapid Security Response (RSR) updates increment the build without changing the major/minor iOS version (for example, iOS 16.5 with RSR might have a build like 20F74). By setting a minimum build, an organization can require that RSR (or other minor security patches) are applied. If a device’s build is lower (meaning it’s missing some security patch), it will be noncompliant[1]. Options are to set a specific build string or leave Not configured. The JSON may include a build requirement if it aims to enforce RSR updates.
Why it’s a Best Practice: Apple now provides critical security patches through RSR updates that don’t change the iOS version. For example, in iOS 16 and 17, RSR patches address urgent vulnerabilities. If your compliance policy only checks the iOS version (e.g., 16.0) and not the build, a device could technically be on 16.0 but missing many patches (if Apple released 16.0.1, 16.0.2, etc. or RSR patches). By specifying a minimum build that corresponds to the latest security patch, you tighten the update requirement further. This is definitely a security best practice for organizations that want to be extremely proactive on patching. Microsoft’s documentation suggests using this feature to ensure devices have applied supplemental security updates[1].
In practice, not all organizations use this, since it requires tracking the exact build numbers of patches. But since our scenario is “strong security”, if the JSON included a minimum build, it indicates they want to enforce even minor patches. For example, if Apple released an RSR to fix a WebKit zero-day, the policy could set the minimum build to the version after that patch. This would block devices that hadn’t applied the RSR (even if their iOS “version” number is technically compliant). This is above and beyond baseline – it aligns with high-security environments (perhaps those concerned with zero-day exploits).
Configuration: If the policy JSON doesn’t explicitly set this, that suggests using the OS version alone. But given best practices, we would recommend configuring it when feasible. The policy author might update it whenever a critical patch is out. By doing so, they compel users to install not just major iOS updates but also the latest security patches that Apple provides, achieving maximum security coverage.
Maximum OS Build: Similarly, an admin could set a maximum build if they wanted to freeze at a certain patch level, but again, that’s not common for security – more for controlling rollouts. Most likely, osMaximumBuildVersion is not set in a best-practice policy (unless temporarily used to delay adoption of a problematic update).
6. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Device Risk Score
Setting:Maximum allowed machine risk score (Defender for Endpoint integration).\ Policy Value:Clear (only “Clear” risk is acceptable; anything higher is noncompliant).\ Purpose & Options: This setting is similar in spirit to the MTD threat level, but specifically for organizations using Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) on iOS. MDE can assess a device’s security risk based on factors like OS vulnerabilities, compliance, and any detected threats (MDE on mobile can flag malicious websites, phishing attempts, or device vulnerabilities). The risk scores are typically Clear, Low, Medium, High (Clear meaning no known risks). In Intune, you can require the device’s MDE-reported risk to be at or below a certain level for compliance[1]. Our policy sets this to Clear, the strictest option, meaning the device must have zero risk findings by Defender to be compliant[3]. If Defender finds anything that raises the risk to Low, Medium, or High, the device will be marked noncompliant. The alternative options would be allowing Low or Medium risk, or Not configured (ignoring Defender’s risk signal).
Why it’s a Best Practice: Requiring a “Clear” risk score from MDE is indeed a high-security best practice, consistent with a zero-tolerance approach to potential threats. It ensures that any device with even a minor security issue flagged by Defender (perhaps an outdated OS, or a known vulnerable app, or malware) is not allowed until that issue is resolved. Microsoft’s Level 3 (High Security) guidance for iOS explicitly adds this requirement on top of the baseline Level 2 settings[3]. They note that this setting should be used if you have Defender for Endpoint, to enforce the highest device risk standard[3].
Defender for Endpoint might mark risk as Medium for something like “OS version is two updates behind” or “phishing site access attempt detected” – with this compliance policy, those events would push the device out of compliance immediately. This is a very security-conscious stance: it leverages Microsoft’s threat intelligence on the device’s state in real time. It’s analogous to having an agent that can say “this phone might be compromised or misconfigured” and acting on that instantly.
Combining MDE risk with the earlier MTD setting might sound redundant, but some organizations use one or the other, or even both for layered security. (Defender for Endpoint can serve as an MTD on iOS in many ways, though iOS’s version of MDE is somewhat limited compared to on Windows – it primarily focuses on network/phishing protection and compliance, since iOS sandboxing limits AV-style scanning.)
In summary, this policy’s choice of Clear means only perfectly healthy devices (as judged by Defender) pass the bar. This is the most secure option and is considered best practice when maximum security is the goal and Defender for Endpoint is part of the toolset[3]. Not configuring it or allowing higher risk might be chosen in lower-tier security configurations to reduce friction, but those introduce more risk.
Note: If an organization doesn’t use Defender for Endpoint on iOS, this setting would be not configured (similar to the MTD case). But since this is a best practice profile, it likely assumes the use of Defender (or some MTD). Microsoft even states that you don’t have to deploy both an MTD and Defender – either can provide the signal[3]. In our context, either “Device Threat Level: Secured” (MTD) or “MDE risk: Clear” (Defender) or both could be in play. Both being set is belt-and-suspenders (and requires both agents), but would indeed ensure no stone unturned for device threats.
7. System Security: Require a Device Passcode
Setting:Device must have a password/PIN to unlock.\ Policy Value:Require (device must be protected by a passcode)[1].\ Purpose & Options: This fundamental setting mandates that the user has set a lock screen passcode (which can be a PIN, password, or biometric with fallback to PIN). Options are Require or Not configured (which effectively means no compliance check on passcode)[1]. By requiring a password, Intune ensures the device is not left unlocked or protected only by swipe (no security). On iOS, any device with a passcode automatically has full-device encryption enabled in hardware[1], so this setting also ensures device encryption is active (since iOS ties encryption to having a PIN/password). If a user had no passcode, Intune will continuously prompt them to set one until they do (the docs note users are prompted every 15 minutes to create a PIN after this policy applies)[1].
Why it’s a Best Practice: It’s hard to overstate – requiring a device passcode is one of the most basic and critical security practices for any mobile device. Without a PIN/Password, if a device is lost or stolen, an attacker has immediate access to all data on it. With our policy, a device lacking a passcode is noncompliant and will be blocked from company resources; plus Intune will nag the user to secure their device[1]. This aligns with essentially every security framework (CIS, NIST, etc.): devices must use authentication for unlock. For instance, the CIS Apple iOS Benchmark requires a passcode be set and complex[4], and the first step in Zero Trust device security is to ensure devices are not openly accessible.
By enforcing this, the policy also leverages iOS’s data encryption. Apple hardware encryption kicks in once a PIN is set, meaning data at rest on the phone is protected by strong encryption tied to the PIN (or biometric)[1]. Our policy thereby guarantees that any device with company data has that data encrypted (which might be an explicit compliance requirement under regulations like GDPR, etc., met implicitly through this control). Microsoft notes this in their docs: “iOS devices that use a password are encrypted”[1] – so requiring the password achieves encryption without a separate setting.
No Password = Not Allowed: The default without this enforcement would be to allow devices even if they had no lock. That is definitely not acceptable for strong security. Thus “Require” is absolutely best practice. This is reflected in Microsoft’s baseline (they configure “Require” for password in even the moderate level)[3]. An Intune compliance policy without this would be considered dangerously lax.
User Impact: Users will be forced to set a PIN if they didn’t have one, which is a minimal ask and now common practice. Some might wonder if Face ID/Touch ID counts – actually, biometrics on iOS still require a PIN as backup, so as long as a PIN is set (which it must be to enable Face/Touch ID), this compliance is satisfied. Therefore biometric users are fine – they won’t have to enter PIN often, but the device is still secure. There’s essentially no drawback, except perhaps initial setup inconvenience. Given the stakes (device access control), this is non-negotiable for any security-conscious org.
8. System Security: Disallow Simple Passcodes
Setting:Block the use of simple passcodes (like repeating or sequential numbers).\ Policy Value:Block (simple passwords are not allowed)[1].\ Purpose & Options: When this compliance rule is Blocked, Intune will treat the device as noncompliant if the user sets an overly simple passcode. “Simple” in iOS typically means patterns like 1111, 1234, 0000, 1212, or other trivial sequences/repeats[5]. If Not configured (the default), the user could potentially use such easy PINs[1]. By blocking simple values, the user must choose a more complex PIN that is not a common pattern. iOS itself has a concept of “Simple Passcode” in configuration profiles – disabling simple means iOS will enforce that complexity when the user creates a PIN.
Why it’s a Best Practice:Simple PINs are easily guessable – they drastically reduce the security of the device. For example, an attacker who steals a phone can easily try “0000” or “1234” first. Many users unfortunately choose these because they’re easy to remember. According to CIS benchmarks, repeating or sequential characters should be disallowed for device PINs[5]. The rationale: “Simple passcodes include repeating, ascending, or descending sequences that are more easily guessed.”[5]. Our policy adheres to that guidance by blocking them.
This restriction significantly increases the effective strength of a 6-digit PIN. There are 1 million possible 6-digit combinations (000000–999999). If simple patterns were allowed, a large portion of users might use one of perhaps 20 very common patterns, which an attacker would certainly attempt first. Blocking those forces diversity. Apple’s own configuration documentation encourages disabling simple values for stronger security in managed deployments.
From a best-practice standpoint, this setting complements the minimum length: it’s not enough to require a PIN, you also require it to have some complexity. It aligns with the principle of using hard-to-guess passwords. In Microsoft’s recommended configuration, they set “simple passwords: Block” even at the enhanced (Level 2) security tier[3]. It’s essentially a baseline requirement when enforcing passcode policies.
User Impact: If a user attempts to set a passcode like 123456, the device (with Intune policy applied) will not accept it. They’ll be required to choose a more complex PIN (e.g., 865309 or some non-pattern). Generally this is a minor inconvenience for a major gain in security. Over time, users typically adapt and choose something memorable yet not straight-line. Admins might provide guidance or passcode creation rules as part of user education.
Bottom line: Blocking simple passcodes is definitely best practice for strong security, eliminating the weakest PIN choices and significantly improving resistance to brute-force guessing[5].
9. System Security: Minimum Passcode Length
Setting:The minimum number of characters/digits in the device passcode.\ Policy Value:6 characters (minimum).\ Purpose & Options: This sets how long the PIN/password must be at minimum. Intune allows configuring any length, but common values are 4 (very weak), 6 (moderate), or higher for actual passwords. Microsoft supports 4 and up for PIN, but 6 is the recommended minimum for modern iOS devices[3]. The policy here uses 6, meaning a 4-digit PIN would be noncompliant – the user must use six or more digits/characters. Options: an admin could set 8, 10, etc., depending on desired security, or leave Not configured (no minimum beyond iOS’s default, which is 4). By enforcing 6, we go beyond the default low bar.
Why it’s a Best Practice: Historically, iPhones allowed a 4-digit PIN. But security research and standards (like CIS) have since moved to 6 as a minimum to provide better security against guessing. A 4-digit PIN has only 10,000 combinations; a 6-digit PIN has 1,000,000 – that’s a two-order-of-magnitude increase in security. Per the CIS iOS benchmark: “Ensure minimum passcode length is at least 6 or greater”[4]. Their rationale: six characters provides reasonable assurance against passcode attacks[4]. Many organizations choose 6 because it strikes a balance between security and usability on a mobile device. Our policy’s value of 6 is aligned with both CIS and Microsoft’s guidance (the Level 2 baseline uses 6 as a default example)[3].
For even stronger security, some high-security environments might require 8 or more (especially if using alphanumeric passcodes). But requiring more than 6 digits on a phone can significantly hurt usability—users might start writing down passcodes if they’re too long/complex. Six is considered a sweet spot: it’s the default for modern iPhones now (when you set a PIN on a new iPhone, Apple asks for 6 by default, indicating Apple’s own move toward better security). Attackers faced with a 6-digit PIN and 10-attempt limit (with device wipe after 10, if enabled by MDM separately) have virtually no chance to brute force offline, and online (on-device) guessing is rate-limited.
Thus, setting 6 as minimum is best practice. It ensures no one can set a 4-digit code (which is too weak by today’s standards)[4]. Some orgs might even consider this the bare minimum and opt for more, but 6 is widely accepted as a baseline for strong mobile security.
Note: The policy says “Organizations should update this setting to match their password policy” in Microsoft’s template[3]. If an org’s policy says 8, they should use 8. But for most, 6 is likely the standard for mobile. The key is: we have a defined minimum > 0. Not setting a minimum (or setting it to 4) would not be best practice. Our profile doing 6 shows it’s aiming for solid security but also keeping user convenience somewhat in mind (since they didn’t jump to, say, 8).
User Impact: Users with a 4-digit PIN (if any exist nowadays) would be forced to change to 6 digits. Most users likely already use 6 due to OS nudges. If they use an alphanumeric password, it must be at least 6 characters. Generally acceptable for users – 6-digit PINs are now common and quick to enter (especially since many use Face ID/Touch ID primarily and only enter the PIN occasionally).
In summary, min length = 6 is a best practice baseline for strong security on iOS, aligning with known guidelines[4].
10. System Security: Required Passcode Type
Setting:Type/complexity of passcode required (numeric, alphanumeric, etc.).\ Policy Value:Numeric (PIN can be purely numeric digits)[3].\ Purpose & Options: Intune allows specifying what kind of characters the device password must contain. The typical options are Numeric (numbers only), Alphanumeric (must include both letters and numbers), or ** device default/Not configured**[1]. If set to Alphanumeric, the user must create a passcode that has at least one letter and one number (and they can include symbols if they want). If Numeric (as our policy), the user can just use digits (no letter required)[1]. Apple’s default on iPhones is actually a 6-digit numeric PIN unless changed to a custom alphanumeric code by the user. So our policy’s Numeric requirement means “we will accept the standard PIN format” – we’re not forcing letters. We are however also blocking simple patterns and requiring length 6, so it’s a complex numeric PIN effectively.
Why it’s configured this way: You might wonder, wouldn’t Alphanumeric be more secure? In pure theory, yes – an alphanumeric password of the same length is stronger than numeric. However, forcing alphanumeric on mobile can impact usability significantly. Typing a complex alphanumeric password every unlock (or even occasionally) is burdensome for users, especially if Face/Touch ID fails or after reboots. Many organizations compromise by allowing a strong numeric PIN, which still provides good security given the other controls (length and device auto-wipe on excessive attempts, etc.). Microsoft’s Level 2 (enhanced) security guidance actually shows Numeric as the recommended setting, with a note “orgs should match their policy”[3]. At Level 3 (high security), Microsoft did not explicitly change it to Alphanumeric in the example (they kept focus on expiration)[3], which implies even high-security profiles might stick to numeric but compensate by other means (like requiring very long numeric or frequent changes).
Is Numeric a best practice? It is a reasonable best practice for most cases: a 6-digit random numeric PIN, especially with the simple sequence restriction and limited attempts, is quite secure. Consider that iOS will erase or lockout after 10 failed tries (if that’s enabled via a separate device configuration profile, which often accompanies compliance). That means an attacker can’t even brute force all 1,000,000 possibilities – they get at most 10 guesses, which is a 0.001% chance if the PIN is random. In contrast, forcing an alphanumeric password might encourage users to use something shorter but with a letter, or they might write it down, etc. The policy likely chose Numeric 6 to maximize adoption and compliance while still being strong. This is consistent with many corporate mobile security policies and the CIS benchmarks (which do not require alphanumeric for mobile, just a strong PIN).
However, for maximum security, an organization might opt for Alphanumeric with a higher minimum length (e.g., 8 or more). That would make unlocking even harder to brute force (though again, iOS has built-in brute force mitigations). Our analysis is that the provided policy is striking a balance: it’s implementing strong security that users will realistically follow. Numeric is called best practice in many guides because trying to impose full computer-style passwords on phones can backfire (users might not comply or might resort to insecure behaviors to cope).
Conclusion on Type: The chosen value Numericwith other constraints is a best practice for most secure deployments. It definitely improves on a scenario where you let device default (which might allow 4-digit numeric or weak patterns if not otherwise blocked). It also reflects real-world use: most users are used to a PIN on phones. For a security-maximal stance, one could argue Alphanumeric is better, but given that our policy already covers length, complexity, and other factors, numeric is justified. So yes, this setting as configured is consistent with a best-practice approach (and one endorsed by Microsoft’s own templates)[3].
If an organization’s policy says “all device passwords must have letters and numbers”, Intune can enforce that by switching this to Alphanumeric. That would be even stricter. But one must weigh usability. If after deployment it’s found that numeric PINs are being compromised (which is unlikely if other controls are in place), then revisiting this could be an enhancement. For now, our strong security policy uses numeric and relies on sufficient length and non-sequence to ensure strength.
11. System Security: Minimum Special Characters
Setting:Minimum number of non-alphanumeric characters required in the passcode.\ Policy Value:0 (since the policy only requires numeric, this isn’t applicable).\ Purpose & Options: This setting only matters if Alphanumeric passwords are required. It lets you enforce that a certain number of characters like ! @ # $ % (symbols) be included[1]. For example, you could require at least 1 special character to avoid passwords that are just letters and numbers. In our policy, because passcode type is Numeric, any value here would be moot – a numeric PIN won’t have symbols or letters at all. It’s likely left at 0 or not configured. If the JSON has it, it’s probably 0. We mention it for completeness.
Why it’s configured this way: In a maximum security scenario with alphanumeric passwords, one might set this to 1 or more for complexity. But since the policy chose Numeric, there’s no expectation of symbols. Setting it to 0 simply means no additional symbol requirement (the default). That’s appropriate here.
If the organization later decided to move to alphanumeric passcodes, increasing this to 1 would then make sense (to avoid users picking simple alphabetic words or just letters+numbers without any symbol). But as things stand, this setting isn’t contributing to security in the numeric-PIN context, and it doesn’t detract either—it’s effectively neutral.
In summary, 0 is fine given numeric PINs. If Alphanumeric were enforced, best practice would be at least 1 special char to ensure complexity (especially if minimum length is not very high). But since we are not requiring letters at all, this is not a factor.
(It’s worth noting iOS on its own does not require special chars in PINs by default; this is purely an extra hardening option available through MDM for password-type codes.)
12. System Security: Maximum Inactivity Time (Auto-Lock)
Setting:Maximum minutes of inactivity before the device screen locks.\ Policy Value:5 minutes.\ Purpose & Options: This compliance rule ensures that the device is set to auto-lock after no more than X minutes of user inactivity[1]. The policy value of 5 minutes means the user’s Auto-Lock (in iOS Settings) must be 5 minutes or less. If a user tried to set “Never” or something longer than 5, Intune would mark the device noncompliant. Options range from “Immediately” (which is essentially 0 minutes) up through various durations (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15 minutes, etc.)[1]. Not configured would not enforce any particular lock timeout.
Why it’s a Best Practice:Limiting the auto-lock timer reduces the window of opportunity for an unauthorized person to snatch an unlocked device or for someone to access it if the user leaves it unattended. 5 minutes of inactivity is a common security recommendation for maximum idle time on mobile devices. Many security standards suggest 5 minutes or less; some high-security environments even use 2 or 3 minutes. Microsoft’s enhanced security example uses 5 minutes for iOS[3]. This strikes a balance between security and usability: the phone will lock fairly quickly when not in use, but not so instantly that it frustrates the user while actively reading something. Without this, a user might set their phone to never lock or to a very long timeout (some users do this for convenience), which is risky because it means the phone could be picked up and used without any authentication if the user leaves it on a desk, etc.
By enforcing 5 minutes, the policy ensures devices lock themselves in a timely manner. That way, even if a user forgets to lock their screen, it won’t sit accessible for more than 5 minutes. Combined with requiring a passcode immediately on unlock (next setting), this means after those 5 minutes, the device will demand the PIN again. This is definitely best practice: both NIST and CIS guidelines emphasize automatic locking. For instance, older U.S. DoD STIGs for mobile mandated a 15-minute or shorter lock; many organizations choose 5 to be safer. It aligns with the concept of least privilege and time-based access — you only stay unlocked as long as needed, then secure the device.
User Impact: Users might notice their screen going black quicker. But 5 minutes is usually not too intrusive; many users have that as default. (In fact, iOS itself often limits how long you can set auto-lock: on some devices, if certain features like managed email or Exchange policies are present, “Never” is not an option. Often the max is 5 minutes unless on power or such. This is partly an OS limitation for security.) So, in practice, this likely doesn’t bother most. If someone had it set to 10 or “Never” before, Intune compliance will force it down to 5.
From security perspective, 5 minutes or even less is recommended. One could tighten to 1 or 2 minutes if ultra-secure, but that might annoy users who have to constantly wake their phone. So 5 is a solid compromise that’s considered a best practice in many mobile security benchmarks (some regulatory templates use 5 as a standard).
13. System Security: Grace Period to Require Passcode
Setting:Maximum time after screen lock before the password is required again.\ Policy Value:5 minutes (set equal to the auto-lock time).\ Purpose & Options: This setting (often called “Require Password after X minutes”) defines if the device was just locked, how soon it requires the PIN to unlock again[1]. iOS has a feature where you can set “require passcode immediately” or after a short delay (like if you lock the phone and then wake it again within, say, 1 minute, you might not need to re-enter the PIN). Security policies often mandate that the passcode be required immediately or very shortly after lock. In our policy, they set 5 minutes. That likely means if the device locks (say due to inactivity or user pressing power button), and the user comes back within 4 minutes, they might not need to re-enter PIN (depending on iOS setting). But beyond 5 minutes, it will always ask. Options range from Immediately up to several minutes or hours[1]. The default not configured would allow whatever the user sets (which could be 15 minutes grace, for example).
Why it’s a Best Practice: Ideally, you want the device to require the passcode as soon as it’s locked or very soon after, to prevent someone from quickly waking it and bypassing PIN if the lock was recent. By setting 5 minutes, the policy still gives a small usability convenience window (the user who locks and unlocks within 5 min might not need to re-enter PIN) but otherwise will always prompt. Many security pros recommend “Immediately” for maximum security, which means always enter PIN on unlock (except when using biometric, which counts as entering it). Our policy uses 5 minutes, likely to align with the auto-lock setting. In effect, this combination means: if the device auto-locks after 5 minutes of idle, and this setting is 5, then effectively whenever the auto-lock kicks in, the PIN will be needed (because by the time 5 min of inactivity passed and it locked, the grace period equals that, so PIN required). If the user manually locks the device and hands it to someone within less than 5 minutes, theoretically they could open it without PIN—unless the device was set by the user to require immediately. Often, MDM policies when set equal like this cause the device to default to immediate requirement (need to double-check iOS behavior, but generally the shorter of the two times rules the actual experience).
In high-security configurations, it’s common to set this to Immediately[1]. If I recall, the CIS benchmark for iOS suggests require passcode immediately or very short delay. But 5 minutes is still within a reasonable security range. The key is, they did not leave it open-ended. They explicitly capped it. This ensures a uniform security posture: you won’t have some devices where user set “require passcode after 15 minutes” (which is the max Apple allows for grace) quietly lurking.
Because our policy aligns these 5-minute values, the practical effect is close to immediate requirement after idle timeout. This is a best practice given usability considerations. It means if a device was locked due to inactivity, it always needs a PIN to get back in (no free unlock). Only in the edge case of manual lock/unlock within 5 min would it not prompt. One might tighten this to 1 minute or Immediately for more security, at cost of convenience.
Conclusion: Having any requirement (not “Not configured”) is the main best practice. 5 minutes is a reasonable secure choice, matching common guidance (for instance, U.K. NCSC guidance suggests short lock times with immediate PIN on resume). For an ultra-secure mode, immediate would be even better – but what’s chosen here is still within best practice range. It certainly is far superior to letting a device sit unlocked or accessible without PIN for long periods. So it checks the box of strong security.
14. System Security: Password Expiration
Setting:Days until the device passcode must be changed.\ Policy Value:365 days (1 year).\ Purpose & Options: This compliance setting forces the user to change their device PIN/password after a certain number of days[1]. In our policy, it’s set to 365, meaning roughly once a year the user will be required to pick a new passcode. Options can range from as low as 30 days to as high as e.g. 730 days, or Not configured (no forced change). If configured, when the passcode age reaches that threshold, Intune will mark the device noncompliant until the user updates their passcode to a new one they haven’t used recently. iOS doesn’t natively expire device PINs on its own, but Intune’s compliance checking can detect the age based on last set time (which on managed devices it can query).
Why it’s a Best Practice: Password (or PIN) rotation requirements have long been part of security policies to mitigate the risk of compromised credentials. For mobile device PINs, it’s somewhat less common to enforce changes compared to network passwords, but in high-security contexts it is done. Microsoft’s Level 3 high-security recommendation for iOS adds a 365-day expiration whereas the lower level didn’t have any expiration[3]. This suggests that in Microsoft’s view, annual PIN change is a reasonable step for the highest security tier. The thinking is: if somehow a PIN was compromised or observed by someone, forcing a change periodically limits how long that knowledge is useful. It also ensures that users are not using the same device PIN indefinitely for many years (which could become stale or known to ex-employees, etc.).
Modern security guidance (like NIST SP 800-63 and others) has moved away from frequent password changes for user accounts, unless there’s evidence of compromise. However, device PINs are a slightly different story – they are shorter and could be considered less robust than an account password. Requiring a yearly change is a light-touch expiration policy (some orgs might do 90 days for devices, but that’s fairly aggressive). One year balances security and user burden. It’s essentially saying “refresh your device key annually”. That is considered acceptable in strong security environments, and not too onerous for users (once a year).
Why not more often? Changing too frequently (like every 30 or 90 days) might degrade security because users could choose weaker or very similar PINs when forced often. Once a year is enough that it could thwart an attacker who learned an old PIN, while not making users circumvent policies. Our policy’s 365-day expiry thus fits a best practice approach that’s also reflected in the high-security baseline by Microsoft[3].
Trade-offs: Some argue that if a PIN is strong and not compromised, forcing a change isn’t necessary and can even be counterproductive by encouraging patterns (like PIN ending in year, etc.). But given this is for maximum security, the conservative choice is to require changes periodically. The user impact is minimal (entering a new PIN once a year and remembering it). Intune will alert the user when their PIN is “expired” by compliance rules, guiding them to update it.
Conclusion: While not every company enforces device PIN expiration, as a strong security best practice it does add an extra layer. Our profile’s inclusion of 365-day expiration is consistent with an environment that doesn’t want any credential (even a device unlock code) to remain static forever[3]. It’s a best practice in the context of high security, and we agree with its use here.
15. System Security: Prevent Reuse of Previous Passcodes
Setting:Number of recent passcodes disallowed when setting a new one.\ Policy Value:5 (cannot reuse any of the last 5 passcodes).\ Purpose & Options: This goes hand-in-hand with the expiration policy. It specifies how many of the user’s most recent passcodes are remembered and blocked from being reused[1]. With a value of 5, when the user is forced to change their PIN, they cannot cycle back to any of their last 5 previously used PINs. Options are any number, typically 1–24, or Not configured (no memory of old PINs, meaning user could alternate between two PINs). Our policy chooses 5, which is a common default for preventing trivial reuse.
Why it’s a Best Practice: If you require password changes, you must also prevent immediate reuse of the same password, otherwise users might just swap between two favorites (like “111111” to “222222” and back to “111111”). By remembering 5, the policy ensures the user can’t just flip between a small set of PINs[1]. They will have to come up with new ones for at least 5 cycles. This promotes better security because it increases the chance that an old compromised PIN isn’t reused. It also encourages users to not just recycle – hopefully each time they choose something unique (at least in a series of 6 or more unique PINs).
The number “5” is somewhat arbitrary but is a standard in many policies (Active Directory password policy often uses 5 or 24). Microsoft’s high-security iOS example uses 365 days expiry but did not explicitly list the history count – likely they do set something, and 5 is often a baseline. CIS benchmarks for mobile device management also suggest preventing at least last 5 passcodes on reuse to avoid alternating patterns.
In short, since our policy does expiration, having a history requirement is necessary to fulfill the intent of expiration. 5 is a reasonable balance (some might choose 3 or 5; some stricter orgs might say 10). Using 5 is consistent with best practices to ensure credential freshness.
User Impact: Minimal – it only matters when changing the PIN. The user just has to pick something they haven’t used recently. Given a year has passed between changes, many might not even remember their 5 PINs ago. If they try something too similar or the same as last time, Intune/iOS will reject it and they’ll choose another. It’s a minor inconvenience but an important piece of enforcing genuine password updates.
Therefore, this setting, as configured, is indeed part of the best practice approach to maintain passcode integrity over time. Without it, the expiration policy would be weaker (users could rotate among two favorites endlessly).
16. Device Security: Restricted Apps
Setting:Block compliance if certain apps are installed (by bundle ID).\ Policy Value:Not configured (no specific restricted apps listed in baseline).\ Purpose & Options: This feature lets admins name particular iOS apps (by their unique bundle identifier) that are not allowed on devices. If a device has any of those apps installed, it’s marked noncompliant[1]. Typically, organizations use this to block known risky apps (e.g., apps that violate policy, known malware apps if any, or maybe unsanctioned third-party app stores, etc.). The JSON policy can include a list of bundle IDs under “restrictedApps”. In a general best-practice baseline, it’s often left empty because the choice of apps is very organization-specific.
Why it’s (not) configured here: Our policy is designed for broad strong security, and doesn’t enumerate any banned apps by default. This makes sense – there isn’t a one-size-fits-all list of iOS apps to block for compliance. However, an organization may decide to add apps to this list over time. For instance, if a certain VPN app or remote-control app is considered insecure, they might add its bundle ID. Or if an app is known to be a root/jailbreak tool, they could list it (though if the device was jailbroken the other control already catches it).
Is this a best practice? The best practice approach is to use this setting judiciously to mitigate specific risks. It’s not a required element of every compliance policy. Many high-security orgs do add a few disallowed apps (for example, maybe banning “Tor Browser” or “Cydia” store which only appears on jailbroken devices) as an extra safety net. In our evaluation, since none are listed, we assume default. That’s fine – it’s better to have no blanket restrictions than to accidentally restrict benign apps. We consider it neutral in terms of the policy’s strength.
However, we mention it because as an additional enhancement (Sub-question 10), an organization could identify and restrict certain apps for even stronger security. For example, if you deem that users should not have any unmanaged cloud storage apps or unapproved messaging apps that could leak data, you could list them here. Each added app tightens security but at the cost of user freedom. Best practice is to ban only those apps that pose a clear security threat or violate compliance (e.g., an antivirus app that conflicts with corporate one, or a known malicious app). Given the evolving threat landscape, administrators should review if any emerging malicious apps on iOS should be flagged.
Conclusion on apps: No specific app restrictions are in the base policy, which is fine as a starting point. It’s something to keep in mind as a customizable part of compliance. The policy as provided is still best practice without any entries here, since all other critical areas are covered.
If not used, this setting doesn’t affect compliance. If used, it can enhance security by targeting specific risks. In a max security regime, you might see it used to enforce that only managed apps are present or that certain blacklisted apps never exist. That would be an additional layer on top of our current policy.
Comparison to Industry Best Practices and Additional Considerations
All the settings above align well with known industry standards for mobile security. Many of them map directly to controls in the CIS (Center for Internet Security) Apple iOS Benchmark or government mobility guidelines, as noted. For example, CIS iOS guidance calls for a mandatory passcode with minimum length 6 and no simple sequences[4][5], exactly what we see in this policy. The Australian Cyber Security Centre and others similarly advise requiring device PIN and up-to-date OS for BYOD scenarios – again reflected here.
Critically, these compliance rules implement the device-side of a Zero Trust model: only devices that are fully trusted (secured, managed, up-to-date) can access corporate data. They work in tandem with Conditional Access policies which would, for instance, block noncompliant devices from email or SharePoint. The combination ensures that even if a user’s credentials are stolen, an attacker still couldn’t use an old, insecure phone to get in, because the device would fail compliance checks.
Potential Drawbacks or Limitations: There are few downsides to these strong settings, but an organization should be aware of user impact and operational factors:
User Experience: Some users might initially face more prompts (e.g., to update iOS or change their PIN). Proper communication and IT support can mitigate frustration. Over time, users generally accept these as standard policy, especially as mobile security awareness grows.
Device Exclusions: Very strict OS version rules might exclude older devices. For instance, an employee with an iPhone that cannot upgrade to iOS 16 will be locked out. This is intentional for security, but the organization should have a plan (perhaps providing updated devices or carving out a temporary exception group if absolutely needed for certain users – though exceptions weaken security).
Biometric vs PIN: Our policy doesn’t explicitly mention biometrics; Intune doesn’t control whether Face ID/Touch ID is used – it just cares that a PIN is set. Some security frameworks require biometrics be enabled or disabled. Here we implicitly allow them (since iOS uses them as convenience on top of PIN). This is usually fine and even preferable (biometrics add another factor, though not explicitly checked by compliance). If an organization wanted to disallow Touch/Face ID (some high-security orgs do, fearing spoofing/legal issues), that would be a device configuration profile setting, not a compliance setting. As is, allowing biometrics is generally acceptable and helps usability without hurting security.
Reliance on Additional Tools: Two of our settings (device threat level, MDE risk) rely on having additional security apps (MTD/Defender) deployed. If those aren’t actually present, those settings do nothing (or we’d not configure them). If they are present, great – we get that extra protection. Organizations need the licensing (Defender for Endpoint or third-party) and deployment in place. For Business Premium (which the repository name hints at), Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is included, so it makes sense to use it. Without it, one could drop those settings and still have a solid compliance core.
Maintenance Effort: As mentioned, minimum OS version and build must be kept updated. This policy is not “set and forget” – admins should bump the minimum OS every so often. For example, when iOS 18 comes and is tested, require at least 17.0. And if major vulnerabilities hit, possibly use the build number rule to enforce rapid patch adoption. This requires tracking Apple’s release cycle and possibly editing the JSON or using Intune UI periodically. That is the price of staying secure: complacency can make a “best practice” policy become outdated. A device compliance policy from 2 years ago that still only requires iOS 14 would be behind the times now. So, regular reviews are needed (Recommendation: review quarterly or with each iOS release).
Conditional Access dependency: The compliance policy by itself just marks devices. To actually block access, one must have Azure AD Conditional Access policies that require device to be compliant for certain apps/data. It sounds like context, but worth noting: to realize the “best practice” outcome (no insecure device gets in), you must pair this with CA. That is presumably in place if they’re talking about Intune compliance (since that’s how it enforces). If not properly configured, a noncompliant device might still access data – so ensure CA policies are set (e.g., “Require compliant device” for all cloud apps or at least email/O365 apps).
Monitoring and Response: IT should watch compliance reports. For example, if a device shows as noncompliant due to, say, “Jailbroken = true,” that’s a serious red flag – follow up with the user, as it could indicate a compromise or at least a policy violation. Similarly, devices not updating OS should be followed up on – perhaps the user clicked “later” on updates; a gentle nudge or help might be needed. The compliance policy can even be set to send a notification after X days of noncompliance (e.g., email user if after 1 week they still aren’t updated). Those actions for noncompliance are configured in Intune (outside the JSON’s main rule set) and are part of maintaining compliance. Best practice is to at least immediately mark noncompliant[3] (which we do) and possibly notify and eventually retire the device if prolonged.
Other Additional Security Settings (if we wanted to enhance further):
Device Encryption: On iOS, as noted, encryption is automatic with a passcode. So we don’t need a separate compliance check for “encryption enabled” (unlike on Android, where that’s a setting). This is covered by requiring a PIN.
Device must be corporate-owned or supervised: Intune compliance policies don’t directly enforce device ownership type. But some orgs might only allow “Corporate” devices to enroll. Not applicable as a JSON setting here, but worth noting as a broader practice: supervised (DEP) iOS devices have more control. If this policy were for corporate-managed iPhones, they likely are supervised, which allows even stricter config (but that’s beyond compliance realm). For BYOD, this policy is about as good as you can do without going to app protection only.
Screen capture or backup restrictions: Those are more Mobile Device Configuration policies (not compliance). For example, one might disallow iCloud backups or require Managed Open-In to control data flow. Those are implemented via Configuration Profiles, not via compliance. So they’re out of scope for this JSON, but they would complement security. Our compliance policy is focusing on device health and basics.
Jailbreak enhanced detection: Ensure Intune’s device settings (like location services) are correctly set if needed, as mentioned, to improve jailbreak detection. Possibly communicate to users that for security, they shouldn’t disable certain settings.
Default iOS vs This Policy: By default, an iPhone imposes very few of these restrictions on its own. Out of the box: a passcode is optional (though encouraged), simple PINs are allowed (and even default to 6-digit but could be 111111), auto-lock could be set to Never, and obviously no concept of compliance. So compared to that, this Intune policy greatly elevates the security of any enrolled device. It essentially brings an unmanaged iPhone up to enterprise-grade security standards:
If a user never set a PIN, now they must.
If they chose a weak PIN, now they must strengthen it.
If they ignore OS updates, now they have to update.
If they somehow tampered (jailbroke) the device, now it gets quarantined.
All these improvements happen without significantly hindering normal use of the phone for legitimate tasks – it mostly works in the background or at setup time.
Recent Updates or Changes in Best Practices: The mobile threat landscape evolves, but as of the current date, these settings remain the gold standard fundamentals. One new element in iOS security is the Rapid Security Response updates, which we’ve covered by possibly using the build version check. Also, the emergence of advanced phishing on mobile has made tools like Defender for Endpoint on mobile more important – hence integrating compliance with device risk (which our policy does) is a newer best practice (a few years ago, not many enforced MTD risk in compliance, now it’s recommended for higher security). The policy reflects up-to-2025 thinking (for instance, including Defender integration[3], which is relatively new).
Apple iOS 17 and 18 haven’t introduced new compliance settings, but one might keep an eye on things like Lockdown Mode (extreme security mode in iOS) – not an Intune compliance check currently, but in the future perhaps there could be compliance checks for that for highest-risk users. For now, our policy covers the known critical areas.
Integration with Other Security Measures: Lastly, it’s worth noting how this compliance policy fits into the overall security puzzle:
It should be used alongside App Protection Policies (MAM) for scenarios where devices aren’t enrolled or to add additional protection inside managed apps (especially for BYOD, where you might want to protect data even if a compliance gap occurs).
It complements Conditional Access as discussed.
It relies on Intune device enrollment – which itself requires user buy-in (users must enroll their device in Intune Company Portal). Communicating the why (“we have these policies to keep company data safe and keep your device safe too”) can help with user acceptance.
These compliance settings also generate a posture that can be fed into a Zero Trust dashboard or risk-based access solutions.
Maintaining and Updating Over Time:\ To ensure these settings remain effective, an organization should:
Update OS requirements regularly: As mentioned, keep track of iOS releases and set a schedule to bump the minimum version after verifying app compatibility. A good practice is to lag one major version behind current (N-1)[3], and possibly enforce minor updates within that via build numbers after major security fixes.
Monitor compliance reports: Use Intune’s reporting to identify devices frequently falling out of compliance. If a particular setting is commonly an issue (say many devices show as noncompliant due to pending OS update), consider if users need more time or if you need to adjust communication. But don’t drop the setting; rather, help users meet it.
Adjust to new threats: If new types of threats emerge, consider employing additional controls. For example, if a certain malicious app trend appears, use the Restricted Apps setting to block those by ID. Or if SIM swapping/ESIM vulnerabilities become a concern, maybe integrate carrier checks if available.
Train users: Make sure users know how to maintain compliance: e.g., how to update iOS, how to reset their PIN if they forget the new one after change, etc. Empower them to do these proactively.
Review password policy alignment: Ensure the mobile PIN requirements align with your overall corporate password policy framework. If the company moves to passwordless or other auth, device PIN is separate but analogous – keep it strong.
Consider feedback: If users have issues (for instance, some older device struggling after OS update), have a process for exceptions or support. Security is the priority, but occasionally a justified exception might be temporarily granted (with maybe extra monitoring). Intune allows scoping policies to groups, so you could have a separate compliance policy for a small group of legacy devices with slightly lower requirements, if absolutely needed, rather than weakening it for all.
In conclusion, each setting in the iOS Intune compliance JSON is indeed aligned with best practices for strong security on mobile devices. Together, they create a layered defense: device integrity, OS integrity, and user authentication security are all enforced. This significantly lowers the risk of data breaches via lost or compromised iPhones/iPads. By understanding and following these settings, the organization ensures that only secure, healthy devices are trusted – a cornerstone of modern enterprise security. [2][3]
This report examines each setting in the provided Intune Windows 10/11 compliance policy JSON and evaluates whether it represents best practice for strong security on a Windows device. For each setting, we explain its purpose, configuration options, and why the chosen value helps ensure maximum security.
Device Health Requirements (Boot Security & Encryption)
Require BitLocker – BitLocker Drive Encryption is mandated on the OS drive (Require BitLocker: Yes). BitLocker uses the system’s TPM to encrypt all data on disk and locks encryption keys unless the system’s integrity is verified at boot[1]. The policy setting “Require BitLocker” ensures that data at rest is protected – if a laptop is lost or stolen, an unauthorized person cannot read the disk contents without proper authorization[1]. Options:Not configured (default, don’t check encryption) or Require (device must be encrypted with BitLocker)[1]. Setting this to “Require” is considered best practice for strong security, as unencrypted devices pose a high data breach risk[1]. In our policy JSON, BitLocker is indeed required[2], aligning with industry recommendations to encrypt all sensitive devices.
Require Secure Boot – This ensures the PC is using UEFI Secure Boot (Require Secure Boot: Yes). Secure Boot forces the system to boot only trusted, signed bootloaders. During startup, the UEFI firmware will verify that bootloader and critical kernel files are signed by a trusted authority and have not been modified[1]. If any boot file is tampered with (e.g. by a bootkit or rootkit malware), Secure Boot will prevent the OS from booting[1]. Options: Not configured (don’t enforce) or Require (must boot in secure mode)[1]. The policy requires Secure Boot[2], which is a best-practice security measure to maintain boot-time integrity. This setting helps ensure the device boots to a trusted state and is not running malicious firmware or bootloaders[1]. Requiring Secure Boot is recommended in frameworks like Microsoft’s security baselines and the CIS benchmarks for Windows, provided the hardware supports it (most modern PCs do)[1].
Require Code Integrity – Code integrity (a Device Health Attestation setting) validates the integrity of Windows system binaries and drivers each time they are loaded into memory. Enforcing this (Require code integrity: Yes) means that if any system file or driver is unsigned or has been altered by malware, the device will be reported as non-compliant[1]. Essentially, it helps detect kernel-level rootkits or unauthorized modifications to critical system components. Options: Not configured or Require (must enforce code integrity)[1]. The policy requires code integrity to be enabled[2], which is a strong security practice. This setting complements Secure Boot by continuously verifying system integrity at runtime, not just at boot. Together, Secure Boot and Code Integrity reduce the risk of persistent malware or unauthorized OS tweaks going undetected[1].
By enabling BitLocker, Secure Boot, and Code Integrity, the compliance policy ensures devices have a trusted startup environment and encrypted storage – foundational elements of a secure endpoint. These Device Health requirements align with best practices like Microsoft’s recommended security baselines (which also require BitLocker and Secure Boot) and are critical to protect against firmware malware, bootkits, and data theft[1][1]. Note: Devices that lack a TPM or do not support Secure Boot will be marked noncompliant, meaning this policy effectively excludes older, less secure hardware from the compliant device pool – which is intentional for a high-security stance.
Device OS Version Requirements
Minimum OS version – This policy defines the oldest Windows OS build allowed on a device. In the JSON, the Minimum OS version is set to 10.0.19043.10000 (which corresponds roughly to Windows 10 21H1 with a certain patch level)[2]. Any Windows device reporting an OS version lower than this (e.g. 20H2 or an unpatched 21H1) will be marked non-compliant. The purpose is to block outdated Windows versions that lack recent security fixes. End users on older builds will be prompted to upgrade to regain compliance[1]. Options: admin can specify any version string; leaving it blank means no minimum enforcement[1]. Requiring a minimum OS version is a best practice to ensure devices have received important security patches and are not running end-of-life releases[1]. The chosen minimum (10.0.19043) suggests that Windows 10 versions older than 21H1 are not allowed, which is reasonable for strong security since Microsoft no longer supports very old builds. This helps reduce vulnerabilities – for example, a device stuck on an early 2019 build would miss years of defenses (like improved ransomware protection in later releases). The policy’s min OS requirement aligns with guidance to keep devices updated to at least the N-1 Windows version or newer.
Maximum OS version – In this policy, no maximum OS version is configured (set to “Not configured”)[2]. That means devices running newer OS versions than the admin initially tested are not automatically flagged noncompliant. This is usually best, because setting a max OS version is typically used only to temporarily block very new OS upgrades that might be unapproved. Leaving it not configured (no upper limit) is often a best practice unless there’s a known issue with a future Windows release[1]. In terms of strong security, not restricting the maximum OS allows devices to update to the latest Windows 10/11 feature releases, which usually improves security. (If an organization wanted to pause Windows 11 adoption, they might set a max version to 10.x temporarily, but that’s a business decision, not a security improvement.) So the policy’s approach – no max version limit – is fine and does align with security best practice in most cases, as it encourages up-to-date systems rather than preventing them.
Why enforce OS versions? Keeping OS versions current ensures known vulnerabilities are patched. For example, requiring at least build 19043 means any device on 19042 or earlier (which have known exposures fixed in 19043+) will be blocked until updated[1]. This reduces the attack surface. The compliance policy will show a noncompliant device “OS version too low” with guidance to upgrade[1], helping users self-remediate. Overall, the OS version rules in this policy push endpoints to stay on supported, secure Windows builds, which is a cornerstone of strong device security.
*(The policy also lists “Minimum/Maximum OS version for *mobile devices” with the same values (10.0.19043.10000 / Not configured)[2]. This likely refers to Windows 10 Mobile or Holographic devices. It’s largely moot since Windows 10 Mobile is deprecated, but having the same minimum for “mobile” ensures something like a HoloLens or Surface Hub also requires an up-to-date OS. In our case, both fields mirror the desktop OS requirement, which is fine.)
Configuration Manager Compliance (Co-Management)
Require device compliance from Configuration Manager – This setting is Not configured in the JSON (i.e. it’s left at default)[2]. It applies only if the Windows device is co-managed with Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (ConfigMgr/SCCM) in addition to Intune. Options: Not configured (Intune ignores ConfigMgr’s compliance state) or Require (device must also meet all ConfigMgr compliance policies)[1].
In our policy, leaving it not configured means Intune will not check ConfigMgr status – effectively the device only has to satisfy the Intune rules to be marked compliant. Is this best practice? For purely Intune-managed environments, yes – if you aren’t using SCCM baselines, there’s no need to require this. If an organization is co-managed and has on-premises compliance settings in SCCM (like additional security baselines or antivirus status monitored by SCCM), a strong security stance might enable this to ensure those are met too[1]. However, enabling it without having ConfigMgr compliance policies could needlessly mark devices noncompliant as “not reporting” (Intune would wait for a ConfigMgr compliance signal that might not exist).
So, the best practice depends on context: In a cloud-only or lightly co-managed setup, leaving this off (Not Configured) is correct[1]. If the organization heavily uses Configuration Manager to enforce other critical security settings, then best practice would be to turn this on so Intune treats any SCCM failure as noncompliance. Since this policy likely assumes modern management primarily through Intune, Not configured is appropriate and not a security gap. (Admins should ensure that either Intune covers all needed checks, or if not, integrate ConfigMgr compliance by requiring it. Here Intune’s own checks are quite comprehensive.)
System Security: Password Requirements
A very important part of device security is controlling access with strong credentials. This policy enforces a strict device password/PIN policy under the “System Security” category:
Require a password to unlock – Yes (Required). This means the device cannot be unlocked without a password or PIN. Users must authenticate on wake or login[1]. Options: Not configured (no compliance check on whether a device has a lock PIN/password set) or Require (device must have a lock screen password/PIN)[1]. Requiring a password is absolutely a baseline security requirement – a device with no lock screen PIN is extremely vulnerable (anyone with physical access could get in). The policy correctly sets this to Require[2]. Intune will flag any device without a password as noncompliant, likely forcing the user to set a Windows Hello PIN or password. This is undeniably best practice; all enterprise devices should be password/PIN protected.
Block simple passwords – Yes (Block). “Simple passwords” refers to very easy PINs like 0000 or 1234 or repeating characters. The setting is Simple passwords: Block[1]. When enabled, Intune will require that the user’s PIN/passcode is not one of those trivial patterns. Options: Not configured (allow any PIN) or Block (disallow common simple PINs)[1]. Best practice is to block simple PINs because those are easily guessable if someone steals the device. This policy does so[2], meaning a PIN like “1111” or “12345” would not be considered compliant. Instead, users must choose less predictable codes. This is a straightforward security best practice (also recommended by Microsoft’s baseline and many standards) to defeat casual guessing attacks.
Password type – Alphanumeric. This setting specifies what kinds of credentials are acceptable. “Alphanumeric” in Intune means the user must set a password or PIN that includes a mix of letters and numbers (not just digits)[1]. The other options are “Device default” (which on Windows typically allows a PIN of just numbers) or explicitly Numeric (only numbers allowed)[1]. Requiring Alphanumeric effectively forces a stronger Windows Hello PIN – it must include at least one letter or symbol in addition to digits. The policy sets this to Alphanumeric[2], which is a stronger stance than a simple numeric PIN. It expands the space of possible combinations, making it much harder for an attacker to brute-force or guess a PIN. This is aligned with best practice especially if using shorter PIN lengths – requiring letters and numbers significantly increases PIN entropy. (If a device only allows numeric PINs, a 6-digit PIN has a million possibilities; an alphanumeric 6-character PIN has far more.) By choosing Alphanumeric, the admin is opting for maximum complexity in credentials.
Note: When Alphanumeric is required, Intune enables additional complexity rules (next setting) like requiring symbols, etc. If instead it was set to “Numeric”, those complexity sub-settings would not apply. So this choice unlocks the strongest password policy options[1].
Password complexity requirements – Require digits, lowercase, uppercase, and special characters. This policy is using the most stringent complexity rule available. Under Intune, for alphanumeric passwords/PINs you can require various combinations: the default is “digits & lowercase letters”; but here it’s set to “require digits, lowercase, uppercase, and special characters”[1]. That means the user’s password (or PIN, if using Windows Hello PIN as an alphanumeric PIN) must include at least one lowercase letter, one uppercase letter, one number, and one symbol. This is essentially a classic complex password policy. Options: a range from requiring just some character types up to all four categories[1]. Requiring all four types is generally seen as a strict best practice for high security (it aligns with many compliance standards that mandate a mix of character types in passwords). The idea is to prevent users from choosing, say, all letters or all numbers; a mix of character types increases password strength. Our policy indeed sets the highest complexity level[2]. This ensures credentials are harder to crack via brute force or dictionary attacks, albeit at the cost of memorability. It’s worth noting modern NIST guidance allows passphrases (which might not have all char types) as an alternative, but in many organizations, this “at least one of each” rule remains a common security practice for device passwords.
Minimum password length – 14 characters. This defines the shortest password or PIN allowed. The compliance policy requires the device’s unlock PIN/password to be 14 or more characters long[1]. Fourteen is a relatively high minimum; by comparison, many enterprise policies set min length 8 or 10. By enforcing 14, this policy is going for very strong password length, which is consistent with guidance for high-security environments (some standards suggest 12+ or 14+ characters for administrative or highly sensitive accounts). Options: 1–16 characters can be set (the admin chooses a number)[1]. Longer is stronger – increasing length exponentially strengthens resistance to brute-force cracking. At 14 characters with the complexity rules above, the space of possible passwords is enormous, making targeted cracking virtually infeasible. This is absolutely a best practice for strong security, though 14 might be considered slightly beyond typical user-friendly lengths. It aligns with guidance like using passphrases or very long PINs for device unlock. Our policy’s 14-char minimum[2] indicates a high level of security assurance (for context, the U.S. DoD STIGs often require 15 character passwords on Windows – 14 is on par with such strict standards).
Maximum minutes of inactivity before password is required – 15 minutes. This controls the device’s idle timeout, i.e. how long a device can sit idle before it auto-locks and requires re-authentication. The policy sets 15 minutes[2]. Options: The admin can define a number of minutes; when not set, Intune doesn’t enforce an inactivity lock (though Windows may have its own default)[1]. Requiring a password after 15 minutes of inactivity is a common security practice to balance security with usability. It means if a user steps away, at most 15 minutes can pass before the device locks itself and demands a password again. Shorter timers (5 or 10 min) are more secure (less window for an attacker to sit at a logged-in machine), whereas longer (30+ min) are more convenient but risk someone opportunistically using an unlocked machine. 15 minutes is a reasonable best-practice value for enterprises – it’s short enough to limit unauthorized access, yet not so short that it frustrates users excessively. Many security frameworks recommend 15 minutes or less for session locks. This policy’s 15-minute setting is in line with those recommendations and thus supports a strong security posture. It ensures a lost or unattended laptop will lock itself in a timely manner, reducing the chance for misuse.
Password expiration (days) – 365 days. This setting forces users to change their device password after a set period. Here it is one year[2]. Options: 1–730 days or not configured[1]. Requiring password change every 365 days is a moderate approach to password aging. Traditional policies often used 90 days, but that can lead to “password fatigue.” Modern NIST guidelines actually discourage frequent forced changes (unless there’s evidence of compromise) because overly frequent changes can cause users to choose weaker passwords or cycle old ones. However, annual expiration (365 days) is relatively relaxed and can be seen as a best practice in some environments to ensure stale credentials eventually get refreshed[1]. It’s basically saying “change your password once a year.” Many organizations still enforce yearly or biannual password changes as a precaution. In terms of strong security, this setting provides some safety net (in case a password was compromised without the user knowing, it won’t work indefinitely). It’s not as critical as the other settings; one could argue that with a 14-char complex password, forced expiration isn’t strictly necessary. But since it’s set, it reflects a security mindset of not letting any password live forever. Overall, 365 days is a reasonable compromise – it’s long enough that users can memorize a strong password, and short enough to ensure a refresh if by chance a password leaked over time. This is largely aligned with best practice, though some newer advice would allow no expiration if other controls (like multifactor auth) are in place. In a high-security context, annual changes remain common policy.
Number of previous passwords to prevent reuse – 5. This means when a password is changed (due to expiration or manual change), the user cannot reuse any of their last 5 passwords[1]. Options: Typically can set a value like 1–50 previous passwords to disallow. The policy chose 5[2]. This is a standard part of password policy – preventing reuse of recent passwords helps ensure that when users do change their password, they don’t just alternate between a couple of favorites. A history of 5 is pretty typical in best practices (common ranges are 5–10) to enforce genuine password updates. This setting is definitely a best practice in any environment with password expiration – otherwise users might just swap back and forth between two passwords. By disallowing the last 5, it will take at least 6 cycles (in this case 6 years, given 365-day expiry) before one could reuse an old password, by which time it’s hoped that password would have lost any exposure or the user comes up with a new one entirely. The policy’s value of 5 is fine and commonly recommended.
Require password when device returns from idle state – Yes (Required). This particularly applies to mobile or Holographic devices, but effectively it means a password is required upon device wake from an idle or sleep state[1]. On Windows PCs, this corresponds to the “require sign-in on wake” setting. Since our idle timeout is 15 minutes, this ensures that when the device is resumed (after sleeping or being idle past that threshold), the user must sign in again. Options: Not configured or Require[1]. The policy sets it to Require[2], which is certainly what we want – it’d be nonsensical to have all the above password rules but then not actually lock on wake! In short, this enforces that the password/PIN prompt appears after the idle period or sleep, which is absolutely a best practice. (Without this, a device could potentially wake up without a login prompt, which would undermine the idle timeout.) Windows desktop devices are indeed impacted by this on next sign-in after an idle, as noted in docs[1]. So this setting ties the loop on the secure password policy: not only must devices have strong credentials, but those credentials must be re-entered after a period of inactivity, ensuring continuous protection.
Summary of Password Policy: The compliance policy highly prioritizes strong access control. It mandates a login on every device (no password = noncompliant), and that login must be complex (not guessable, not short, contains diverse characters). The combination of Alphanumeric, 14+ chars, all character types, no simple PINs is about as strict as Windows Intune allows for user sign-in credentials[1][2]. This definitely meets the definition of best practice for strong security – it aligns with standards like CIS benchmarks which also suggest enforcing password complexity and length. Users might need to use passphrases or a mix of PIN with letters to meet this, but that is intended. The idle lock at 15 minutes and requirement to re-authenticate on wake ensure that even an authorized session can’t be casually accessed if left alone for long. The annual expiration and password history add an extra layer to prevent long-term use of any single password or recycling of old credentials, which is a common corporate security requirement.
One could consider slight adjustments: e.g., some security frameworks (like NIST SP 800-63) would possibly allow no expiration if the password is sufficiently long and unique (to avoid users writing it down or making minor changes). However, given this is a “strong security” profile, the chosen settings err on the side of caution, which is acceptable. Another improvement for extreme security could be shorter idle time (like 5 minutes) to lock down faster, but 15 minutes is generally acceptable and strikes a balance. Overall, these password settings significantly harden the device against unauthorized access and are consistent with best practices.
Encryption of Data Storage on Device
Require encryption of data storage on device – Yes (Required). Separate from the BitLocker requirement in Device Health, Intune also has a general encryption compliance rule. Enabling this means the device’s drives must be encrypted (with BitLocker, in the case of Windows) or else it’s noncompliant[1]. In our policy, “Encryption: Require” is set[2]. Options: Not configured or Require[1]. This is effectively a redundant safety net given BitLocker is also specifically required. According to Microsoft, the “Encryption of data storage” check looks for any encryption present (on the OS drive), and specifically on Windows it checks BitLocker status via a device report[1]. It’s slightly less robust than the Device Health attestation for BitLocker (which needs a reboot to register, etc.), but it covers the scenario generally[1].
From a security perspective, requiring device encryption is unquestionably best practice. It ensures that if a device’s drive isn’t encrypted (for example, BitLocker not enabled or turned off), the device will be flagged. This duplicates the BitLocker rule; having both doesn’t hurt – in fact, Microsoft documentation suggests the simpler encryption compliance might catch the state even if attestation hasn’t updated (though the BitLocker attestation is more reliable for TPM verification of encryption)[1].
In practice, an admin could use one or the other. This policy enables both, which indicates a belt-and-suspenders approach: either way, an unencrypted device will not slip through. This is absolutely aligned with strong security – all endpoints must have storage encryption, mitigating the risk of data exposure from lost or stolen hardware. Modern best practices (e.g. CIS, regulatory requirements like GDPR for laptops with personal data) often mandate full-disk encryption; here it’s enforced twice. The documentation even notes that relying on the BitLocker-specific attestation is more robust (it checks at the TPM level and knows the device booted with BitLocker enabled)[1][1]. The generic encryption check is a bit more broad but for Windows equates to BitLocker anyway. The key point is the policy requires encryption, which we already confirmed is a must-have security control. If BitLocker was somehow not supported on a device (very rare on Windows 10/11, since even Home edition has device encryption now), that device would simply fail compliance – again, meaning only devices capable of encryption and actually encrypted are allowed, which is appropriate for a secure environment.
(Note: Since both “Require BitLocker” and “Require encryption” are turned on, an Intune admin should be aware that a device might show two noncompliance messages for essentially the same issue if BitLocker is off. Users would see that they need to turn on encryption to comply. Once BitLocker is enabled and the device rebooted, both checks will pass[1][1]. The rationale for using both might be to ensure that even if the more advanced attestation didn’t report, the simpler check would catch it.)
This section of the policy ensures that essential security features of Windows are active:
Firewall – Require. The policy mandates that the Windows Defender Firewall is enabled on the device (Firewall: Require)[1]. This means Intune will mark the device noncompliant if the firewall is turned off or if a user/app tries to disable it. Options: Not configured (do not check firewall status) or Require (firewall must be on)[1]. Requiring the firewall is definitely best practice – a host-based firewall is a critical first line of defense against network-based attacks. The Windows Firewall helps block unwanted inbound connections and can enforce outbound rules as well. By ensuring it’s always on (and preventing users from turning it off), the policy guards against scenarios where an employee might disable the firewall and expose the machine to threats[1]. This setting aligns with Microsoft recommendations and CIS Benchmarks, which also advise that Windows Firewall be enabled on all profiles. Our policy sets it to Require[2], which is correct for strong security. (One thing to note: if there were any conflicting GPO or config that turns the firewall off or allows all traffic, Intune would consider that noncompliant even if Intune’s own config profile tries to enable it[1] – essentially, Intune checks the effective state. Best practice is to avoid conflicts and keep the firewall defaults to block inbound unless necessary[1].)
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) – Require. This check ensures the device has a TPM chip present and enabled (TPM: Require)[1]. Intune will look for a TPM security chip and mark the device noncompliant if none is found or it’s not active. Options: Not configured (don’t verify TPM) or Require (TPM must exist)[1]. TPM is a hardware security module used for storing cryptographic keys (like BitLocker keys) and for platform integrity (measured boot). Requiring a TPM is a strong security stance because it effectively disallows devices that lack modern hardware security support. Most Windows 10/11 PCs do have TPM 2.0 (Windows 11 even requires it), so this is feasible and aligns with best practices. It ensures features like BitLocker are using TPM protection and that the device can do hardware attestation. The policy sets TPM to required[2], which is a best practice consistent with Microsoft’s own baseline (they recommend excluding non-TPM machines, as those are typically older or less secure). By enforcing this, you guarantee that keys and sensitive operations can be hardware-isolated. A device without TPM could potentially store BitLocker keys in software (less secure) or not support advanced security like Windows Hello with hardware-backed credentials. So from a security viewpoint, this is the right call. Any device without a TPM (or with it disabled) will need remediation or replacement, which is acceptable in a high-security environment. This reflects a zero-trust hardware approach: only modern, TPM-equipped devices can be trusted fully[1].
Antivirus – Require. The compliance policy requires that antivirus protection is active and up-to-date on the device (Antivirus: Require)[1]. Intune checks the Windows Security Center status for antivirus. If no antivirus is registered, or if the AV is present but disabled/out-of-date, the device is noncompliant[1]. Options: Not configured (don’t check AV) or Require (must have AV on and updated)[1]. It’s hard to overstate the importance of this: running a reputable, active antivirus/antimalware is absolutely best practice on Windows. The policy’s requirement means every device must have an antivirus engine running and not report any “at risk” state. Windows Defender Antivirus or a third-party AV that registers with Security Center will satisfy this. If a user has accidentally turned off real-time protection or if the AV signatures are old, Intune will flag it[1]. Enforcing AV is a no-brainer for strong security. This matches all industry guidance (e.g., CIS Controls highlight the need for anti-malware on all endpoints). Our policy does enforce it[2].
Antispyware – Require. Similar to antivirus, this ensures anti-spyware (malware protection) is on and healthy (Antispyware: Require)[1]. In modern Windows terms, “antispyware” is essentially covered by Microsoft Defender Antivirus as well (Defender handles viruses, spyware, all malware). But Intune treats it as a separate compliance item to check in Security Center. This setting being required means the anti-malware software’s spyware detection component (like Defender’s real-time protection for spyware/PUPs) must also be enabled and not outdated[1]. Options: Not configured or Require, analogous to antivirus[1]. The policy sets it to Require[2]. This is again best practice – it ensures comprehensive malware protection is in place. In effect, having both AV and antispyware required just double-checks that the endpoint’s security suite is fully active. If using Defender, it covers both; if using a third-party suite, as long as it reports to Windows Security Center for both AV and antispyware status, it will count. This redundancy helps catch any scenario where maybe virus scanning is on but spyware definitions are off (though that’s rare with unified products). For our purposes, requiring antispyware is simply reinforcing the “must have anti-malware” rule – clearly aligned with strong security standards.
Collectively, these Device Security settings (Firewall, TPM, AV, antispyware) ensure that critical protective technologies are in place on every device:
The firewall requirement guards against network attacks and unauthorized connections[1].
The TPM requirement ensures hardware-based security for encryption and identity[1].
The AV/antispyware requirements ensure continuous malware defense and that no device is left unprotected against viruses or spyware[1].
All are definitely considered best practices. In fact, running without any of these (no firewall, no AV, etc.) would be considered a serious security misconfiguration. This policy wisely enforces all of them. Any device not meeting these (e.g., someone attempts to disable Defender Firewall or uninstall AV) will get swiftly flagged, which is exactly what we want in a secure environment.
*(Side note: The policy’s reliance on Windows Security Center means it’s vendor-agnostic; e.g., if an organization uses Symantec or another AV, as long as that product reports a good status to Security Center, Intune will see the device as compliant for AV/antispyware. If a third-party AV is used that *disables* Windows Defender, that’s fine because Security Center will show another AV is active. The compliance rule will still require that one of them is active. So this is a flexible but strict enforcement of “you must have one”.)*
Microsoft Defender Anti-malware Requirements
The policy further specifies settings under Defender (Microsoft Defender Antivirus) to tighten control of the built-in anti-malware solution:
Microsoft Defender Antimalware – Require. This means the Microsoft Defender Antivirus service must be running and cannot be turned off by the user[1]. If the device’s primary AV is Defender (as is default on Windows 10/11 when no other AV is installed), this ensures it stays on. Options: Not configured (Intune doesn’t ensure Defender is on) or Require (Defender AV must be enabled)[1]. Our policy sets it to Require[2], which is a strong choice. If a third-party AV is present, how does this behave? Typically, when a third-party AV is active, Defender goes into a passive mode but is still not “disabled” in Security Center terms – or it might hand over status. This setting primarily aims to prevent someone from turning off Defender without another AV in place. Requiring Defender antivirus to be on is a best practice if your organization relies on Defender as the standard AV. It ensures no one (intentionally or accidentally) shuts off Windows’ built-in protection[1]. It essentially overlaps with the “Antivirus: Require” setting, but is more specific. The fact that both are set implies this environment expects to use Microsoft Defender on all machines (which is common for many businesses). In a scenario where a user installed a 3rd party AV that doesn’t properly report to Security Center, having this required might actually conflict (because Defender might register as off due to third-party takeover, thus Intune might mark noncompliant). But assuming standard behavior, if third-party AV is present and reporting, Security Center usually shows “Another AV is active” – Intune might consider the AV check passed but the “Defender Antimalware” specifically could possibly see Defender as not the active engine and flag it. In any case, for strong security, the ideal is to have a consistent AV (Defender) across all devices. So requiring Defender is a fine security best practice, and our policy reflects that intention. It aligns with Microsoft’s own baseline for Intune when organizations standardize on Defender. If you weren’t standardized on Defender, you might leave this not configured and just rely on the generic AV requirement. Here it’s set, indicating a Defender-first strategy for antimalware.
Microsoft Defender Antimalware minimum version – 4.18.0.0. This setting specifies the lowest acceptable version of the Defender Anti-Malware client. The policy has defined 4.18.0.0 as the minimum[2]. Effect: If a device has an older Defender engine below that version, it’s noncompliant. Version 4.18.x is basically the Defender client that ships with Windows 10 and above (Defender’s engine is updated through Windows Update periodically, but the major/minor version has been 4.18 for a long time). By setting 4.18.0.0, essentially any Windows 10/11 with Defender should meet it (since 4.18 was introduced years ago). This catches only truly outdated Defender installations (perhaps if a machine had not updated its Defender platform in a very long time, or is running Windows 8.1/7, which had older Defender versions – though those OS wouldn’t be in a Win10 policy anyway). Options: Admin can input a specific version string, or leave blank (no version enforcement)[1]. The policy chose 4.18.0.0, presumably because that covers all modern Windows builds (for example, Windows 10 21H2 uses Defender engine 4.18.x). Requiring a minimum Defender version is a good practice to ensure the anti-malware engine itself isn’t outdated. Microsoft occasionally releases new engine versions with improved capabilities; if a machine somehow fell way behind (e.g., an offline machine that missed engine updates), it could have known issues or be missing detection techniques. By enforcing a minimum, you compel those devices to update their Defender platform. Version 4.18.0.0 is effectively the baseline for Windows 10, so this is a reasonable choice. It’s likely every device will already have a later version (like 4.18.210 or similar). As a best practice, some organizations might set this to an even more recent build number if they want to ensure a certain monthly platform update is installed. In any case, including this setting in the policy shows thoroughness – it’s making sure Defender isn’t an old build. This contributes to security by catching devices that might have the Defender service but not the latest engine improvements. Since the policy’s value is low (4.18.0.0), practically all supported Windows 10/11 devices comply, but it sets a floor that excludes any unsupported OS or really old install. This aligns with best practice: keep security software up-to-date, both signatures and the engine. (The admin should update this minimum version over time if needed – e.g., if Microsoft releases Defender 4.19 or 5.x in the future, they might raise the bar.)
Microsoft Defender security intelligence up-to-date – Require. This is basically ensuring Defender’s virus definitions (security intelligence) are current (Security intelligence up-to-date: Yes)[1]. If Defender’s definitions are out of date, Intune will mark noncompliant. “Up-to-date” typically means the signature is not older than a certain threshold (usually a few days, defined by Windows Security Center’s criteria). Options: Not configured (don’t check definitions currency) or Require (must have latest definitions)[1]. It’s set to Require in our policy[2]. This is clearly a best practice – an antivirus is only as good as its latest definitions. Ensuring that the AV has the latest threat intelligence is critical. This setting will catch devices that, for instance, haven’t gone online in a while or are failing to update Defender signatures. Those devices would be at risk from newer malware until they update. By marking them noncompliant, it forces an admin/user to take action (e.g. connect to the internet to get updates)[1]. This contributes directly to security, keeping anti-malware defenses sharp. It aligns with common security guidelines that AV should be kept current. Since Windows usually updates Defender signatures daily (or more), this compliance rule likely treats a device as noncompliant if signatures are older than ~3 days (Security Center flag). This policy absolutely should have this on, and it does – another check in the box for strong security practice.
Real-time protection – Require. This ensures that Defender’s real-time protection is enabled (Realtime protection: Require)[1]. Real-time protection means the antivirus actively scans files and processes as they are accessed, rather than only running periodic scans. If a user had manually turned off real-time protection (which Windows allows for troubleshooting, or sometimes malware tries to disable it), this compliance rule would flag the device. Options: Not configured or Require[1]. Our policy requires it[2]. This is a crucial setting: real-time protection is a must for proactive malware defense. Without it, viruses or spyware could execute without immediate detection, and you’d only catch them on the next scan (if at all). Best practice is to never leave real-time protection off except perhaps briefly to install certain software, and even then, compliance would catch that and mark the device not compliant with policy. So turning this on is definitely part of a strong security posture. The policy correctly enforces it. It matches Microsoft’s baseline and any sane security policy – you want continuous scanning for threats in real time. The Intune CSP for this ensures that the toggle in Windows Security (“Real-time protection”) stays on[1]. Even if a user is local admin, turning it off will flip the device to noncompliant (and possibly trigger Conditional Access to cut off corporate resource access), strongly incentivizing them not to do that. Good move.
In summary, the Defender-specific settings in this policy double-down on malware protection:
The Defender AV engine must be active (and presumably they expect to use Defender on all devices)[1].
Defender must stay updated – both engine version and malware definitions[1][1].
These are all clearly best practices for endpoint security. They ensure the built-in Windows security is fully utilized. The overlap with the general “Antivirus/Antenna” checks means there’s comprehensive coverage. Essentially, if a device doesn’t have Defender, the general AV required check would catch it; if it does have Defender, these specific settings enforce its quality and operation. No device should be running with outdated or disabled Defender in a secure environment, and this compliance policy guarantees that.
(If an organization did use a third-party AV instead of Defender, they might not use these Defender-specific settings. The presence of these in the JSON indicates alignment with using Microsoft Defender as the standard. That is indeed a good practice nowadays, as Defender has top-tier ratings and seamless integration. Many “best practice” guides, including government blueprints, now assume Defender is the AV to use, due to its strong performance and integration with Defender for Endpoint.)
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) – Device Threat Risk Level
Finally, the policy integrates with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) by using the setting:
Require the device to be at or under the machine risk score – Medium. This ties into MDE’s threat intelligence, which assesses each managed device’s risk level (based on detected threats on that endpoint). The compliance policy is requiring that a device’s risk level be Medium or lower to be considered compliant[1]. If MDE flags a device as High risk, Intune will mark it noncompliant and can trigger protections (like Conditional Access blocking that device). Options: Not configured (don’t use MDE risk in compliance) or one of Clear, Low, Medium, High as the maximum allowed threat level[1]. The chosen value “Medium” means: any device with a threat rated High is noncompliant, while devices with Low or Medium threats are still compliant[1]. (Clear would be the most strict – requiring absolutely no threats; High would be least strict – tolerating even high threats)[1].
Setting this to Medium is a somewhat balanced security stance. Let’s interpret it: MDE categorizes threats on devices (malware, suspicious activity) into risk levels. By allowing up to Medium, the policy is saying if a device has only low or medium-level threats, we still consider it compliant; but if it has any high-level threat, that’s unacceptable. High usually indicates serious malware outbreaks or multiple alerts, whereas low may indicate minimal or contained threats. From a security best-practice perspective, using MDE’s risk as a compliance criterion is definitely recommended – it adds an active threat-aware dimension to compliance. The choice of Medium as the cutoff is probably to avoid overly frequent lockouts for minor issues, while still reacting to major incidents.
Many security experts would advocate for even stricter: e.g. require Low or Clear (meaning even medium threats would cause noncompliance), especially in highly secure environments where any malware is concerning. In fact, Microsoft’s documentation notes “Clear is the most secure, as the device can’t have any threats”[1]. Medium is a reasonable compromise – it will catch machines with serious infections but not penalize ones that had a low-severity event that might have already been remediated. For example, if a single low-level adware was detected and quarantined, risk might be low and the device remains compliant; but if ransomware or multiple high-severity alerts are active, risk goes high and the device is blocked until cleaned[1].
In our policy JSON, it’s set to Medium[2], which is in line with many best practice guides (some Microsoft baseline recommendations also use Medium as the default, to balance security and usability). This is still considered a strong security practice because any device under an active high threat will immediately be barred. It leverages real-time threat intelligence from Defender for Endpoint to enhance compliance beyond just configuration. That means even if a device meets all the config settings above, it could still be blocked if it’s actively compromised – which is exactly what we want. It’s an important part of a Zero Trust approach: continuously monitor device health and risk, not just initial compliance.
One could tighten this to Low for maximum security (meaning even medium threats cause noncompliance). If an organization has low tolerance for any malware, they might do that. However, Medium is often chosen to avoid too many disruptions. For our evaluation: The inclusion of this setting at all is a best practice (many might forget to use it). The threshold of Medium is acceptable for strong security, catching big problems while allowing IT some leeway to investigate mediums without immediate lockout. And importantly, if set to Medium, only devices with severe threats (like active malware not neutralized) will be cut off, which likely correlates with devices that indeed should be isolated until fixed.
To summarize, the Defender for Endpoint integration means this compliance policy isn’t just checking the device’s configuration, but also its security posture in real-time. This is a modern best practice: compliance isn’t static. The policy ensures that if a device is under attack or compromised (per MDE signals), it will lose its compliant status and thus can be auto-remediated or blocked from sensitive resources[1]. This greatly strengthens the security model. Medium risk tolerance is a balanced choice – it’s not the absolute strictest, but it is still a solid security stance and likely appropriate to avoid false positives blocking users unnecessarily.
(Note: Organizations must have Microsoft Defender for Endpoint properly set up and the devices onboarded for this to work. Given it’s in the policy, we assume that’s the case, which is itself a security best practice – having EDR (Endpoint Detection & Response) on all endpoints.)
Actions for Noncompliance and Additional Considerations
The JSON policy likely includes Actions for noncompliance (the blueprint shows an action “Mark device noncompliant (1)” meaning immediate)[2]. By default, Intune always marks a device as noncompliant if it fails a setting – which is what triggers Conditional Access or other responses. The policy can also be configured to send email notifications, or after X days perform device retire/wipe, etc. The snippet indicates the default action to mark noncompliant is at day 1 (immediately)[2]. This is standard and aligns with security best practice – you want noncompliant devices to be marked as such right away. Additional actions (like notifying user, or disabling the device) could be considered but are not listed.
It’s worth noting a few maintenance and dependency points:
Updating the Policy: As new Windows versions release, the admin should review the Minimum OS version field and advance it when appropriate (for example, when Windows 10 21H1 becomes too old, they might raise the minimum to 21H2 or Windows 11). Similarly, the Defender minimum version can be updated over time. Best practice is to review compliance policies at least annually (or along with major new OS updates)[1][1] to keep them effective.
Device Support: Some settings have hardware prerequisites (TPM, Secure Boot, etc.). In a strong security posture, devices that don’t meet these (older hardware) should ideally be phased out. This policy enforces that by design. If an organization still has a few legacy devices without TPM, they might temporarily drop the TPM requirement or grant an exception group – but from a pure security standpoint, it’s better to upgrade those devices.
User Impact and Change Management: Enforcing these settings can pose adoption challenges. For example, requiring a 14-character complex password might generate more IT support queries or user friction initially. It is best practice to accompany such policy with user education and perhaps rollout in stages. The policy as given is quite strict, so ensuring leadership backing and possibly implementing self-service password reset (to handle expiry) would be wise. These aren’t policy settings per se, but operational best practices.
Complementary Policies: A compliance policy like this ensures baseline security configuration, but it doesn’t directly configure the settings on the device (except for password requirement which the user is prompted to set). It checks and reports compliance. To actually turn on things like BitLocker or firewall if they’re off, one uses Configuration Profiles or Endpoint Security policies in Intune. Best practice is to pair compliance policies with configuration profiles that enable the desired settings. For instance, enabling BitLocker via an Endpoint Security policy and then compliance verifies it’s on. The question focuses on compliance policy, so our scope is those checks, but it’s assumed the organization will also deploy policies to turn on BitLocker, firewall, Defender, etc., making it easy for devices to become compliant.
Protected Characteristics: Every setting here targets technical security and does not discriminate or involve user personal data, so no concerns there. From a privacy perspective, the compliance data is standard device security posture info.
Conclusion
Overall, each setting in this Windows compliance policy aligns with best practices for securing Windows 10/11 devices. The policy requires strong encryption, up-to-date and secure OS versions, robust password/PIN policies, active firewall and anti-malware, and even ties into advanced threat detection (Defender for Endpoint)[2][2]. These controls collectively harden the devices against unauthorized access, data loss, malware infections, and unpatched vulnerabilities.
Almost all configurations are set to their most secure option (e.g., requiring vs not, or maximum complexity) as one would expect in a high-security baseline:
Data protection is ensured by BitLocker encryption on disk[1].
Boot integrity is assured via Secure Boot and Code Integrity[1].
Users must adhere to a strict password policy (complex, long, regularly changed)[1].
Critical security features (firewall, AV, antispyware, TPM) must be in place[1][1].
Endpoint Defender is kept running in real-time and up-to-date[1].
Devices under serious threat are quarantined via noncompliance[1].
All these are considered best practices by standards such as the CIS Benchmark for Windows and government cybersecurity guidelines (for example, the ASD Essential Eight in Australia, which this policy closely mirrors, calls for application control, patching, and admin privilege restriction – many of which this policy supports by ensuring fundamental security hygiene on devices).
Are there any settings that might not align with best practice? Perhaps the only debatable one is the 365-day password expiration – modern NIST guidelines suggest you don’t force changes on a schedule unless needed. However, many organizations still view an annual password change as reasonable policy in a defense-in-depth approach. It’s a mild requirement and not draconian, so it doesn’t significantly detract from security; if anything, it adds a periodic refresh which can be seen as positive (with the understanding that user education is needed to avoid predictable changes). Thus, we wouldn’t call it a wrong practice – it’s an accepted practice in many “strong security” environments, even if some experts might opt not to expire passwords arbitrarily. Everything else is straightforwardly as per best practice or even exceeding typical baseline requirements (e.g., 14 char min is quite strong).
Improvements or additions: The policy as given is already thorough. An organization could consider tightening the Defender for Endpoint risk level to Low (meaning only absolutely clean devices are compliant) if they wanted to be extra careful – but that could increase operational noise if minor issues trigger noncompliance too often[1]. They could also reduce the idle timeout to, say, 5 or 10 minutes for devices in very sensitive environments (15 minutes is standard, though stricter is always an option). Another possible addition: enabling Jailbreak detection – not applicable for Windows (it’s more for mobile OS), Windows doesn’t have a jailbreak setting beyond what we covered (DHA covers some integrity). Everything major in Windows compliance is covered here.
One more setting outside of this device policy that’s a tenant-wide setting is “Mark devices with no compliance policy as noncompliant”, which we would assume is enabled at the Intune tenant level for strong security (so that any device that somehow doesn’t get this policy is still not trusted)[3]. The question didn’t include that, but it’s a part of best practices – likely the organization would have set it to Not compliant at the tenant setting to avoid unmanaged devices slipping through[3].
In conclusion, each listed setting is configured in line with strong security best practices for Windows devices. The policy reflects an aggressive security posture: it imposes strict requirements that greatly reduce the risk of compromise. Devices that meet all these conditions will be quite well-hardened against common threats. Conversely, any device failing these checks is rightfully flagged for remediation, which helps the IT team maintain a secure fleet. This compliance policy, especially when combined with Conditional Access (to prevent noncompliant devices from accessing corporate data) and proper configuration policies (to push these settings onto devices), provides an effective enforcement of security standards across the Windows estate[3][3]. It aligns with industry guidelines and should substantially mitigate risks such as data breaches, malware incidents, and unauthorized access. Each setting plays a role: from protecting data encryption and boot process to enforcing user credentials and system health – together forming a comprehensive security baseline that is indeed consistent with best practices.
In today’s digital workspace, AI-powered assistants like Microsoft 365 Copilot and traditional search engines serve different purposes and excel in different scenarios. This guide explains why you should not treat an AI tool such as Copilot as a general web search engine, and details when to use AI over a normal search process. We also provide example Copilot prompts that outperform typical search queries in answering common questions.
Understanding AI Tools (Copilot) vs. Traditional Search Engines
AI tools like Microsoft 365 Copilot are conversational, context-aware assistants, whereas search engines are designed for broad information retrieval. Copilot is an AI-powered tool that helps with work tasks, generating responses in real-time using both internet content and your work content (emails, documents, etc.) that you have permission to access[1]. It is embedded within Microsoft 365 apps (Word, Excel, Outlook, Teams, etc.), enabling it to produce outputs relevant to what you’re working on. For example, Copilot can draft a document in Word, suggest formulas in Excel, summarize an email thread in Outlook, or recap a meeting in Teams, all by understanding the context in those applications[1]. It uses large language models (like GPT-4) combined with Microsoft Graph (your organizational data) to provide personalized assistance[1].
On the other hand, a search engine (like Google or Bing) is a software system specifically designed to search the World Wide Web for information based on keywords in a query[2]. A search engine crawls and indexes billions of web pages and, when you ask a question, it returns a list of relevant documents or links ranked by algorithms. The search engine’s goal is to help you find relevant information sources – you then read or navigate those sources to get your answer.
Key differences in how they operate:
Result Format: A traditional search engine provides you with a list of website links, snippets, or media results. You must click through to those sources to synthesize an answer. In contrast, Copilot provides a direct answer or content output (e.g. a summary, draft, or insight), often in a conversational format, without requiring you to manually open multiple documents. It can combine information from multiple sources (including your files and the web) into a single cohesive response on the spot[3].
Context and Personalization: Search engines can use your location or past behavior for minor personalization, but largely they respond the same way to anyone asking a given query. Copilot, however, is deeply personalized to your work context – it can pull data from your emails, documents, meetings, and chats via Microsoft Graph to tailor its responses[1]. For example, if you ask “Who is my manager and what is our latest project update?”, Copilot can look up your manager’s name from your Office 365 profile and retrieve the latest project info from your internal files or emails, giving a personalized answer. A public search engine would not know these personal details.
Understanding of Complex Language: Both modern search engines and AI assistants handle natural language, but Copilot (AI) can engage in a dialogue. You can ask Copilot follow-up questions or make iterative requests in a conversation, refining what you need, which is not how one interacts with a search engine. Copilot can remember context from earlier in the conversation for additional queries, as long as you stay in the same chat session or document, enabling complex multi-step interactions (e.g., first “Summarize this report,” then “Now draft an email to the team with those key points.”). A search engine treats each query independently and doesn’t carry over context from previous searches.
Learning and Adaptability:AI tools can adapt outputs based on user feedback or organization-specific training. Copilot uses advanced AI (LLMs) which can be “prompted” to adjust style or content. For instance, you can tell Copilot “rewrite this in a formal tone” or “exclude budget figures in the summary”, and it will attempt to comply. Traditional search has no such direct adaptability in generating content; it can only show different results if you refine your keywords.
Output Use Cases: Perhaps the biggest difference is in what you use them for: Copilot is aimed at productivity tasks and analysis within your workflow, while search is aimed at information lookup. If you need to compose, create, or transform content, an AI assistant shines. If you need to find where information resides on the web, a search engine is the go-to tool. The next sections will dive deeper into these distinctions, especially why Copilot is not a straight replacement for a search engine.
Limitations of Using Copilot as a Search Engine
While Copilot is powerful, you should not use it as a one-to-one substitute for a search engine. There are several reasons and limitations that explain why:
Accuracy and “Hallucinations”: AI tools sometimes generate incorrect information very confidently – a phenomenon often called hallucination. They do not simply fetch verified facts; instead, they predict answers based on patterns in training data. A recent study found that generative AI search tools were inaccurate about 60% of the time when answering factual queries, often presenting wrong information with great confidence[4]. In that evaluation, Microsoft’s Copilot (in a web search context) was about 70% completely inaccurate in responding to certain news queries[4]. In contrast, a normal search engine would have just pointed to the actual news articles. This highlights that Copilot may give an answer that sounds correct but isn’t, especially on topics outside your work context or beyond its training. Using Copilot as a general fact-finder can thus be risky without verification.
Lack of Source Transparency: When you search the web, you get a list of sources and can evaluate the credibility of each (e.g., you see it’s from an official website, a recent date, etc.). With Copilot, the answer comes fused together, and although Copilot does provide citations in certain interfaces (for instance, Copilot in Teams chat will show citations for the sources it used[1]), it’s not the same as scanning multiple different sources yourself. If you rely on Copilot alone, you might miss the nuance and multi-perspective insight that multiple search results would offer. In short, Copilot might tell you “According to the data, Project Alpha increased sales by 5%”, whereas a search engine would show you the report or news release so you can verify that 5% figure in context. Over-reliance on AI’s one-shot answer could be misleading if the answer is incomplete or taken out of context.
Real-Time Information and Knowledge Cutoff:Search engines are constantly updated – they crawl news sites, blogs, and the entire web continuously, meaning if something happened minutes ago, a search engine will likely surface it. Copilot’s AI model has a knowledge cutoff (it doesn’t automatically know information published after a certain point unless it performs a live web search on-demand). Microsoft 365 Copilot can fetch information from Bing when needed, but this is an optional feature under admin control[3][3], and Copilot has to decide to invoke it. If web search is disabled or if Copilot doesn’t recognize that it should look online, it will answer from its existing knowledge base and your internal data alone. Thus, for breaking news or very recent events, Copilot might give outdated info or no info at all, whereas a web search would be the appropriate tool. Even with web search enabled, Copilot generates a query behind the scenes and might not capture the exact detail you want, whereas you could manually refine a search engine query. In summary, Copilot is not as naturally in tune with the latest information as a dedicated search engine[5].
Breadth of Information:Copilot is bounded by what it has been trained on and what data you provide to it. It is excellent on enterprise data you have access to and general knowledge up to its training date, but it is not guaranteed to know about every obscure topic on the internet. A search engine indexes virtually the entire public web; if you need something outside of Copilot’s domain (say, a niche academic paper or a specific product review), a traditional search is more likely to find it. If you ask Copilot an off-topic question unrelated to your work or its training, it might struggle or give a generic answer. It’s not an open portal to all human knowledge in the way Google is.
Multiple Perspectives and Depth: Some research questions or decisions benefit from seeing diverse sources. For example, before making a decision you might want to read several opinions or analyses. Copilot will tend to produce a single synthesized answer or narrative. If you only use that, you could miss out on alternative viewpoints or conflicting data that a search could reveal. Search engines excel at exploratory research – scanning results can give you a quick sense of consensus or disagreement on a topic, something an AI’s singular answer won’t provide.
Interaction Style: Using Copilot is a conversation, which is powerful but can also be a limitation when you just need a quick fact with zero ambiguity. Sometimes, you might know exactly what you’re looking for (“ISO standard number for PDF/A format”, for instance). Typing that into a search engine will instantly yield the precise fact. Asking Copilot might result in a verbose answer or an attempt to be helpful beyond what you need. For quick, factoid-style queries (dates, definitions, simple facts), a search engine or a structured Q\&A database might be faster and cleaner.
Cost and Access: While not a technical limitation, it’s worth noting that Copilot (and similar AI services) often comes with licensing costs or usage limits[6]. Microsoft 365 Copilot is a premium feature for businesses or certain Microsoft 365 plans. Conducting a large number of general searches through Copilot could be inefficient cost-wise if a free search engine could do the job. In some consumer scenarios, Copilot access might even be limited (for example, personal Microsoft accounts have a capped number of Copilot uses per month without an upgrade[6]). So, from a practical standpoint, you wouldn’t want to spend your limited Copilot queries on trivial lookups that Bing or Google could handle at no cost.
Ethical and Compliance Factors: Copilot is designed to respect organizational data boundaries – it won’t show you content from your company that you don’t have permission to access[1]. On the flip side, if you try to use it like a search engine to dig up information you shouldn’t access, it won’t bypass security (which is a good thing). A search engine might find publicly available info on a topic, but Copilot won’t violate privacy or compliance settings to fetch data. Also, in an enterprise, all Copilot interactions are auditable by admins for security[3]. This means your queries are logged internally. If you were using Copilot to search the web for personal reasons, that might be visible to your organization’s IT – another reason to use a personal device or external search for non-work-related queries.
Bottom line:Generative AI tools like Copilot are not primarily fact-finding tools – they are assistants for generating and manipulating content. Use them for what they’re good at (as we’ll detail next), and use traditional search when you need authoritative information discovery, multiple source verification, or the latest updates. If you do use Copilot to get information, be prepared to double-check important facts against a reliable source.
When to Use AI Tools (Copilot) vs. When to Use Search Engines
Given the differences and limitations above, there are distinct scenarios where using an AI assistant like Copilot is advantageous, and others where a traditional search is better. Below are detailed reasons and examples for each, to guide you on which tool to use for a given need:
Scenarios Where Copilot (AI) Excels:
Synthesizing Information and Summarization: When you have a large amount of information and need a concise summary or insight, Copilot shines. For instance, if you have a lengthy internal report or a 100-thread email conversation, Copilot can instantly generate a summary of key points or decisions. This saves you from manually reading through tons of text. One of Copilot’s standout uses is summarizing content; reviewers noted the ability to condense long PDFs into bulleted highlights as “indispensable, offering a significant boost in productivity”[7]. A search engine can’t summarize your private documents – that’s a job for AI.
Using Internal and Contextual Data:If your question involves data that is internal to your organization or personal workflow, use Copilot. No search engine can index your company’s SharePoint files or your Outlook inbox (those are private). Copilot, however, can pull from these sources (with proper permissions) to answer questions. For example, *“What decision did
In this video, I walk you through my step-by-step process for creating a powerful, no-cost Microsoft 365 Copilot chat agent that searches my blog and delivers instant, well-formatted answers to technical questions. Watch as I demonstrate how to set up the agent, configure it to use your own public website as a knowledge source, and leverage AI to boost productivity—no extra licenses required! Whether you want to streamline your workflow, help your team access information faster, or just see what’s possible with Microsoft 365’s built-in AI, this guide will show you how to get started and make the most of your content. if you want a copy of the ‘How to’ document for this video then use this link – https://forms.office.com/r/fqJXdCPAtU
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Here’s a detailed breakdown to help you decide when to use Microsoft 365 Copilot (standard) versus a dedicated agent like Researcher or Analyst, especially for SMB (Small and Medium Business) customers. This guidance is based on internal documentation, email discussions, and Microsoft’s public announcements.
Uses Microsoft Graph to access your tenant’s data securely.
Best for lightweight tasks and real-time assistance
Researcher Agent
Designed for deep, multi-step reasoning.
Gathers and synthesizes information from emails, files, meetings, chats, and the web.
Produces structured, evidence-backed reports with citations.
Ideal for market research, competitive analysis, go-to-market strategies, and client briefings.
Analyst Agent
Thinks like a data scientist.
Uses chain-of-thought reasoning and can run Python code.
Ideal for data-heavy tasks: forecasting, customer segmentation, financial modeling.
Can analyze data across multiple spreadsheets and visualize insights.
SMB-Specific Considerations
Licensing: SMBs using Microsoft 365 Business Premium can access Copilot, but Researcher and Analyst require Copilot licenses and are part of the Frontier program.
Security: Business Premium includes tools like eDiscovery, audit logging, and data loss prevention to monitor Copilot usage and protect sensitive data.
Deployment: SMBs should ensure foundational productivity setup, data structuring, and AI readiness before deploying advanced agents.
Simple Guidance for SMBs
Start with M365 Copilot Chat for daily tasks, onboarding, and quick answers.
Use Researcher when you need a comprehensive answer that spans multiple data sources and includes citations.
Use Analyst when you need to analyze or visualize data, especially for strategic planning or reporting.
To deploy Microsoft 365 Copilot, including the Researcher and Analyst agents, in small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), you’ll need to follow a structured approach that balances licensing, governance, security, and user enablement. Here’s a detailed breakdown based on internal documentation, email guidance, and Microsoft’s official resources.
Deployment Overview for SMBs
1. Licensing Requirements
To use Microsoft 365 Copilot and its advanced agents:
Base License: Users must have one of the following:
Microsoft 365 Business Premium
Microsoft 365 E3 or E5
Office 365 E3 or E5
Copilot Add-on License: Required for access to tenant data and advanced agents like Researcher and Analyst. This license costs approximately \$360/year per user.
2. Agent Availability and Installation
Microsoft provides three deployment paths for agents:
Agent Type
Who Installs
Examples
Governance
Microsoft-installed
Microsoft
Researcher, Analyst
Admins can block globally
Admin-installed
IT Admins
Custom or partner agents
Full lifecycle control
User-installed
End users
Copilot Studio agents
Controlled by admin policy
Researcher and Analyst are pre-installed and pinned for all users with Copilot licenses.
Admins can manage visibility and access via the Copilot Control System in the Microsoft 365 Admin Center.
3. Security and Governance for SMBs
Deploying Copilot in SMBs requires attention to data access and permission hygiene:
Copilot respects existing permissions, but if users are over-permissioned, they may inadvertently access sensitive data.
Use least privilege access principles to avoid data oversharing.
Leverage Microsoft 365 Business Premium features like:
Microsoft Purview for auditing and DLP
Entra ID for Conditional Access
Defender for Business for endpoint protection
4. Agent Creation with Copilot Studio
For SMBs wanting tailored AI experiences:
Use Copilot Studio to build custom agents for HR, IT, or operations.
No-code interface allows business users to create agents without developer support.
Agents can be deployed in Teams, Outlook, or Copilot Chat for seamless access.
5. Training and Enablement
Encourage users to explore agents via the Copilot Chat web tab.
Use Copilot Academy and Microsoft’s curated learning paths to upskill staff.
Promote internal champions to guide adoption and gather feedback.
✅ Deployment Checklist for SMBs
Step
Action
1
Confirm eligible Microsoft 365 licenses
2
Purchase and assign Copilot licenses
3
Review and tighten user permissions
4
Enable or restrict agents via Copilot Control System
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