Category: Intune

Shipping Intune App Protection Policies for BYOD: What Actually Works in Production

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App Protection Policies (APP, sometimes called MAM) are the single highest-ROI control in Business Premium for BYOD. You get corporate data containerisation on an unenrolled iPhone or Android device in about an afternoon — if you avoid the usual landmines. Here’s the pattern I ship to MSP clients.

Prerequisites people miss

APP only protects apps that implement the Intune App SDK (Outlook, Teams, Word, Edge, OneDrive, etc.). That’s most of M365, but not every third-party app the user loves. Before you touch a policy:

  • Every targeted user must have an Intune Plan 1 licence (bundled in Business Premium and the E3/E5 stack).

  • Company Portal must be installed on Android. iOS doesn’t strictly need it for MAM-WE (without enrolment), but Authenticator is required for sign-in brokering.

  • For Android, you need the Play Integrity verdict configured if you plan to block rooted devices — and Play Store access, which rules out many China-market devices.

  • Decide now whether you’ll pair APP with a Conditional Access grant of Require app protection policy. If yes, your CA policy needs to exclude break-glass accounts and any service accounts that hit Graph from mobile.

See the App protection policies overview for the full support matrix.

Where to configure

Everything lives in the Microsoft Intune admin center at intune.microsoft.com:

  • Apps → App protection policies → Create policy → pick iOS/iPadOS or Android. You create one policy per platform.

  • Target apps: start with “Selected apps” and pick the core Microsoft apps. Do not start with “All Microsoft Apps” — you’ll regret it the first time Teams Rooms or a hybrid meeting app trips the policy.

  • Data protection settings: align with Microsoft’s Level 2 enterprise enhanced framework as your default. Level 1 is too loose for anyone storing client data; Level 3 breaks copy/paste workflows most SMBs rely on.

  • Access requirements: PIN of 6 digits, biometric allowed, 30-minute offline grace.

  • Conditional launch: jailbreak/root = Block access, min OS version = current−1, max PIN attempts = 5 → Wipe data. Full reference at Conditional launch actions.

The rollout pattern that actually works

Three rings, two weeks each, no exceptions:

  1. Ring 0 — IT and champions (5–10 users). Assign to a dynamic security group. Set Conditional launch actions to Warn, not Block. Let it bake. You are looking for app conflicts, not policy correctness.

  2. Ring 1 — Pilot department (25–50 users). Flip conditional launch to Block. Enable CA “require app protection policy” in report-only mode. Watch sign-in logs for a week — you will find the one user still using the native iOS Mail app.

  3. Ring 2 — Everyone. Move CA to On. Decommission any “allow legacy auth” exceptions at the same time — clients will push back, hold the line.

Use assignment filters (not separate groups) to carve out corporate-owned devices from BYOD rules. It scales; groups don’t.

The three pitfalls that bite

1. Policy conflicts silently pick the most restrictive value. If a user is in two groups with different PIN lengths, they get the longer one — and no error surfaces. Run one policy per platform per persona. Document which group wins.

2. Selective wipe isn’t device wipe. Apps → App selective wipe removes corporate data from managed apps only — photos, personal iMessages, the user’s Spotify library all stay. Train your service desk to say this out loud when an employee leaves. Also: the wipe only fires the next time the user opens the app, and can take 30 minutes.

3. Conditional launch “Min OS version” will brick users overnight. When Apple ships iOS 19 and you’ve set “Min OS version = 18”, a user on 17 walks in on Monday and can’t open Outlook. Always pair Min OS version with a Warn action first, run it for a fortnight, then escalate to Block.

Get these three right and APP is genuinely boring — which, for mobile security, is exactly what you want.

Self-Service Password Reset with writeback: the rollout that doesn’t burn your helpdesk

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SSPR is a box most MSPs tick on day one of a Business Premium tenant and then never look at again. That’s fine until a hybrid customer calls because Karen changed her password on My Sign-Ins, logged into her domain-joined laptop, and got rejected. SSPR without writeback is half a feature. Here’s how to deploy the whole thing properly.

Prerequisites people miss

The obvious ones — an Entra ID P1 license (included in Business Premium) and either Entra Connect Sync or Entra Connect Cloud Sync — aren’t where rollouts die. The misses are:

  • On-prem AD permissions for the sync account. The account running Connect (or the Cloud Sync provisioning agent) needs Reset password, Change password, Write lockoutTime, and Write pwdLastSet on the user OUs. The Connect wizard grants these if you let it; locked-down AD environments often don’t. Writeback fails silently if these are missing.

  • A matching on-prem password policy. Entra enforces its own complexity rules. If your on-prem policy is stricter (minimum length, history, banned words), a user’s new cloud password will be rejected by AD when it writes back, and the user will see a generic error. Align them before you enable, not after.

  • Combined registration actually enabled and enforced. Legacy SSPR-only registration still exists in old tenants. If users register methods for MFA but not SSPR, the reset flow blocks them.

See Microsoft’s writeback concept doc for the full supported-operations list: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-sspr-writeback(opens in new window).

Where to configure it

Everything is in the Entra admin centre — no PowerShell required for a standard deploy.

The rollout pattern that works

Don’t flip it on tenant-wide. The pattern that doesn’t generate tickets:

  1. Pilot group of ~10 — IT plus two friendly business users. Scope SSPR to that group only. Verify a reset from My Sign-Ins actually lands in AD (pwdLastSet on the DC is your proof).

  2. Registration campaign to the pilot for 14 days. Force them through combined registration. Watch the Registration report for stragglers.

  3. Broaden by department, not by “All users.” Finance first, then ops, then field staff. Each wave gets the campaign a week before the SSPR scope flips.

  4. Protect the registration step with Conditional Access. Use Register security information as the user action and require MFA (or a Temporary Access Pass for new starters): https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-all-users-security-info-registration(opens in new window). Without this, an attacker who phishes a password can register their own MFA method and own the account.

Top pitfalls

  1. Admins can’t use SSPR the same way users can. Privileged roles are locked to strong methods and can’t rely on Security Questions. Test with an admin-tier account before you cut over — and keep a break-glass account that is explicitly excluded from the CA registration policy.

  2. Writeback “works” but the user still can’t log in. Nine times out of ten this is cached credentials on a domain-joined laptop that hasn’t seen a DC since the reset. Tell the user to connect to the corporate network or VPN and lock/unlock. Bake this into your helpdesk script.

  3. Cloud Sync vs Connect Sync confusion. You can run them side-by-side, but writeback must be enabled on whichever one syncs that user’s domain. Audit first — we’ve seen tenants with both running where writeback was enabled on the wrong one and nobody noticed until a reset failed.

Enable it properly once, and SSPR moves from a compliance checkbox to a real helpdesk-deflection tool.

Intune Filters vs Assignment Groups: Stop Treating Them as Interchangeable

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If your Intune estate has grown past a couple of hundred devices, you’ve probably built a forest of dynamic groups that only you understand. You don’t need another group. You need a filter. Here’s where each one earns its keep, and where MSPs keep getting the split wrong.

The mental model

Groups answer who the policy targets. Filters answer which subset of that assignment it actually applies to at evaluation time. A group is resolved at assignment and refreshed on Entra’s schedule. A filter is evaluated per device, per policy, at the point of applicability. That timing difference is the entire reason filters exist — and the reason swapping one for the other silently changes behaviour.

Use groups for ownership of the assignment (department, site, client tenant, pilot ring). Use filters for device traits that change underneath you: OS version, model, enrollment profile, personal vs corporate, join type.

Prerequisites people miss

  • Filters only work on managed devices and managed apps — the supported workload matrix matters. Not every policy type honours filters, and app assignment filters for MAM are a different object from device assignment filters. Check the reference before assuming your policy can be filtered.

  • Dynamic device groups require at least one Entra ID P1 licence in the tenant. Business Premium covers you, but confirm before promising dynamic membership to an M365 Standard client.

  • The “All users” and “All devices” virtual groups bypass normal targeting logic. If a client’s environment feels “haunted”, check whether a legacy assignment is hitting All devices with no filter.

Where to configure

In the Intune admin center, filters live under Tenant administration → Filters. Build the rule, pick the platform, and save — the filter itself has no targets. You apply it at assignment time on any supported policy (Devices → Configuration → your profile → Assignments → Edit filter).

Groups are managed in the same console under Groups, but remember these are Entra ID security groups — any change you make is tenant-wide, not Intune-only.

The rollout pattern that actually works

  1. Ring by group, scope by filter. Three device groups (Pilot, Early, Broad) assigned by user or device attribute. Apply the same policy to all three with different filters (e.g. deviceOwnership -eq "Corporate" plus osVersion -startsWith "10.0.22").

  2. Exclude filters beat exclusion groups. If you’re excluding kiosks from a CA-backed compliance policy, a filter keyed on enrollmentProfileName is faster to audit than a stale exclusion group nobody refreshes.

  3. Name everything for future-you. FLT-Win11-Corp-NotKiosk beats Filter1. Same for groups: prefix by purpose (INT- for Intune-only, SEC- for CA), include platform, include intent.

  4. Test in report-only. Every new filter goes onto one profile assigned to a lab group first. Confirm the Assignment status report matches expectation before widening.

The pitfalls that will bite you

  • Filter evaluation is not group membership. A filter excluding “personal” devices won’t retroactively remove a policy from a device that was previously “corporate” until the device checks in and the assignment re-evaluates. Plan for the delay during ownership changes.

  • Negation logic is deceptively literal. -notEquals treats a null property as “not equal”, so filters on sparsely populated properties (custom enrollment profile names, model on older hardware) can match devices you didn’t intend. Test with -eq plus include/exclude to lock it down.

  • Overlapping filters on the same assignment don’t AND. If you add a filter and also use include/exclude groups, precedence rules apply — exclude always wins, then filters, then includes. Map this out before complaining about “Intune not applying my policy.”

References

BitLocker Silent Enablement via Intune: The Deployment Pattern That Actually Sticks

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Every MSP ends up doing BitLocker. Very few do it silently on the first attempt. Between TPM quirks, third-party encryption leftovers, and the three different Intune policy surfaces that all claim to configure BitLocker, the difference between “encrypted fleet with recoverable keys” and “2am call from a locked-out CEO” is a handful of settings. Here’s the pattern to deploy in production under Microsoft 365 Business Premium.

Prerequisites people skip

Silent means standard user, no prompts, no elevation — which is a higher bar than “BitLocker on.”

  • TPM 2.0, ready state, UEFI, Secure Boot on. If the TPM reports “not ready” or is owned by a prior OEM image, silent encryption aborts. Check with Get-Tpm before blaming policy.

  • Entra joined or Hybrid joined. Workgroup and AD-only devices have no key escrow target and will not silently encrypt.

  • No third-party encryption agent. McAfee DE, Sophos SafeGuard, legacy Dell Data Protection — all block BitLocker takeover until fully decrypted and uninstalled.

  • No startup PIN or startup key requirement. Silent mode and pre-boot authentication are mutually exclusive. Pick one.

  • WinRE present and healthy. BitLocker uses it for recovery.

If any of those are wrong, don’t touch policy yet. Fix the device first.

Where to configure it

Ignore the Settings Catalog for this one. Microsoft is explicit that the Settings Catalog does not expose the TPM startup authentication controls silent enablement depends on (docs).

Use the Endpoint security path:

Intune admin center → Endpoint security → Disk encryption → Create Policy → Platform: Windows → Profile: BitLocker.

The settings that actually matter for silent:

  • Enable full disk encryption for OS and fixed data drives: Yes
  • Hide prompt about third-party encryption: Yes
  • Allow standard users to enable encryption during Autopilot: Yes
  • Require device to back up recovery information to Azure AD: Yes (gates encryption on successful escrow — this is the setting that saves you)

  • Recovery password rotation: Enable on Entra and Hybrid-joined devices
  • OS and fixed drive: XTS-AES 256, TPM-only protector, no PIN

Full setting reference: Disk encryption profile settings.

The rollout pattern

Do not target All Devices. Ever.

  1. Pilot ring (5–10 devices): your own, one per client hardware family. Watch the Endpoint security → Disk encryption report for “Encrypted” status and a recovery key present in Entra. If the key isn’t there, the device isn’t safe, regardless of what Windows says.

  2. Early ring (10–20% by dynamic group): let this soak for a week. Check the encryption report daily. Anything stuck in “Waiting for response” usually means TPM readiness or a WinRE issue — remediate per device, don’t loosen policy.

  3. Broad rollout: remaining corporate devices via a dynamic group filtered on deviceOwnership eq "Company". Never include BYO.

  4. New builds: bake the policy into Autopilot so encryption completes during ESP. Standard-user silent enablement only works if “Allow standard users to enable encryption during Autopilot” is Yes — double-check before you cut a new image.

The help desk also needs the recovery-key retrieval flow documented before you go broad, not after the first lockout.

The pitfalls that bite

  • Silent and startup PIN are incompatible. If compliance demands pre-boot auth, you’re running standard BitLocker, not silent. Decide once.

  • Recovery key escrow failures hide in plain sight. Without “Require device to back up recovery information to Azure AD = Yes”, devices encrypt, keys never land in Entra, and you discover it the day a laptop gets stolen. Audit the encryption report monthly — the ground truth is “Recovery key: Yes/No” per device, not policy compliance.

  • Don’t mix endpoint protection + disk encryption profiles targeting the same devices. Conflicts resolve unpredictably. Pick the Disk encryption profile and delete the legacy Endpoint protection one (policy comparison).

Get those three right and BitLocker becomes a checkbox — exactly what your clients are paying for.

Autopilot + ESP: The Deployment Pattern That Actually Survives Contact With Real Users

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If you’re still PXE-booting laptops in the back room in 2026, you owe your techs a better life. Windows Autopilot with a properly configured Enrollment Status Page (ESP) is the MSP deployment pattern that scales — but only if you stop treating ESP as a tick-box and start treating it as the gate that enforces your security posture before the user ever sees a desktop. Here’s the deploy-it-well version.

Prerequisites People Miss

Business Premium gets you the licensing — Entra ID P1, Intune, and Windows 11 Pro/Enterprise entitlements. The bits that actually bite:

  • Automatic MDM enrollment must be on. Entra admin center → Mobility (MDM and WIP) → Microsoft Intune → MDM user scope = All (or a group). Miss this and the device joins Entra but never enrols into Intune, and the ESP just hangs.

  • Hardware hash registration path. For anything beyond a one-off, get the reseller to register devices to your tenant at purchase. Manual CSV uploads at OOBE are fine for a test VM; they’re a tax on your L1 team in production.

  • TPM 2.0 + device attestation are non-negotiable for self-deploying and pre-provisioning scenarios. VMs won’t cut it, and attestation needs outbound HTTPS to vendor-specific endpoints.

  • Cloud-native over hybrid join. Microsoft’s own guidance is explicit: deploy new devices as Entra-joined. If you’re still standing up the Intune Connector for AD in 2026, have a very good reason written down.

Full list: Windows Autopilot requirements.

Where To Configure

Everything lives in the Microsoft Intune admin center. Two paths you’ll wear out:

  • Deployment profile — Devices → Windows → Device onboarding → Enrollment → Windows Autopilot → Deployment Profiles → Create profile → Windows PC. User-driven, Entra-joined, Standard user account type, hide EULA and privacy settings, set a device name template, allow pre-provisioned deployment.

  • ESP profile — Devices → Device onboarding → Enrollment → Windows tab → Enrollment Status Page → Create. Do not edit the default “All users and all devices” profile — create your own and give it a higher priority.

References: Configure Windows Autopilot profiles and Set up the Enrollment Status Page.

The Rollout Pattern That Works

Three rings, same as your update rings. Don’t skip this.

  1. Pilot (IT / internal). Loose ESP — Block device use = No, timeout 90 minutes, log collection on. You want visibility, not gates.

  2. Early adopters. ESP enforced at the device phase only. Block device use = Yes, timeout 60 minutes, custom error message with your service desk number. Turn off the User / Account Setup phase — the overwhelming majority of ESP failures happen there, and device-targeted apps have already installed by that point.

  3. Production. Lock it. Required blocking apps = your EDR (Defender), BitLocker initiation, and one small “canary” Win32 app that proves apps are actually flowing. No more than five blocking apps total.

Assign both profiles to a dynamic device group filtered on (device.devicePhysicalIDs -any _ -contains "[ZTDId]") so Autopilot-registered devices land automatically.

Top Pitfalls

  • Too many blocking apps. Every blocking app is a potential ESP timeout. Keep it to security essentials; let the rest stream in post-desktop via required assignments.

  • User-phase ESP left enabled. User-targeted apps plus Known Folder Move plus OneDrive sync at first login is a timeout factory. Disable the account setup phase unless you have a specific, measured reason to keep it.

  • Dynamic group latency. Group membership can take minutes to evaluate and devices race ahead of policy. Mitigation: move to Autopilot device preparation (enrollment-time grouping) for new greenfield tenants, or accept the ring-one pilot friction as the cost of dynamic groups.

For the broader lifecycle picture, start at Overview of Windows Autopilot.

Deploy it once, deploy it tight, and your zero-touch goes from aspirational to boring — which is exactly what production should be.

New Publication – Microsoft Intune: Complete Getting Started Guide for MSP Technicians

blog

https://directorcia.gumroad.com/l/intunegs

Unlock the Power of Modern Device Management with Microsoft Intune!

Are you ready to transform your IT operations and deliver seamless, secure device management for your clients or organization? This publication is your essential guide to mastering Microsoft Intune in small-to-medium business environments, packed with actionable insights, step-by-step instructions, and real-world best practices1.

Why Choose This Guide?

  • Comprehensive & Practical: Written as a hands-on runbook, this publication walks you through every critical step—from tenant setup and device enrollment to policy creation, app deployment, and troubleshooting. Each procedure is explained in clear, jargon-free language, so you know not just what to do, but why it matters1.

  • For All Skill Levels: Whether you’re a Level 1 technician new to device management or a seasoned MSP architect, you’ll find targeted sections for your needs. L1s get the basics and rollout checklists; L2/L3s get advanced automation, multi-tenant architecture, and the latest platform updates1.

  • Up-to-Date for 2026: Stay ahead of the curve with coverage of critical updates, new features, and evolving best practices—including Windows 10 end-of-life, Azure Front Door IP changes, Autopilot v2, AI-powered Intune Suite features, and expanded support for Linux and macOS1.

  • Troubleshooting & Optimization: Avoid common pitfalls with detailed troubleshooting guides, diagnostic tools, and security quick wins. Learn how to monitor, report, and remotely manage devices for maximum efficiency and compliance1.

  • Customer Communication Templates: Reduce helpdesk calls and boost user satisfaction with ready-to-use email templates, BYOD guides, and rollout communications1.

Who Should Buy This Guide?

  • Managed Service Providers (MSPs) seeking to scale operations and deliver consistent, high-quality Intune deployments.

  • IT professionals and consultants responsible for device management, security, and compliance in Microsoft 365 environments.

  • Organizations planning migrations, upgrades, or new deployments of Microsoft Intune.

What You’ll Achieve

  • Confidently build, operate, and troubleshoot Intune environments.

  • Streamline onboarding, policy rollout, and app deployment across Windows, macOS, iOS/iPadOS, and Android.

  • Implement best practices for security, compliance, and ongoing maintenance.

  • Communicate effectively with end users and stakeholders.

Don’t settle for guesswork—equip yourself with the definitive guide to Microsoft Intune and deliver results that delight your clients and users.

See all the titles available at – https://directorcia.gumroad.com/

ASD iOS Compliance policy check script

Screenshot 2025-11-25 085221

I’ve taken the iOS Compliance policy settings recommendations from the ASD Blueprint for Secure Cloud and created an online JSON settings file here:

https://github.com/directorcia/bp/blob/main/Intune/Policies/ASD/ios-compliance.json

I’ve then created a PowerShell script here:

https://github.com/directorcia/Office365/blob/master/asd-ioscomp-get.ps1

with documentation here:

https://github.com/directorcia/Office365/wiki/ASD-iOS-Compliance-Policy-Check

that reads the online JSON file (or uses a local version if you want to use that) and compares the recommended ASD settings to those in your own Intune environment. Note, the script makes NO CHANGES to your environment, it simply reads the current settings.

It then produces the console output you see above and a HTML report like this:

Screenshot 2025-11-25 085940

You can refer to this page I also created:

https://github.com/directorcia/bp/wiki/iOS-Compliance-Policy-Settings-%E2%80%90-Security-Rationale

as to why these settings are important to the security of your M365 environment.

Look out for more scripts like this coming soon. I welcome any suggestion about improving this.

ASD Windows Compliance policy check script

Screenshot 2025-11-19 101833

I’ve taken the Windows Compliance policy settings recommendations from the ASD Blueprint for Secure Cloud and created an online JSON settings file here:

https://github.com/directorcia/bp/blob/main/Intune/Policies/ASD/windows-compliance.json

I’ve then created a PowerShell script here:

https://github.com/directorcia/Office365/blob/master/asd-wincomp-get.ps1

with documentation here:

https://github.com/directorcia/Office365/wiki/Windows-Compliance-Policy-Check

that reads the online JSON file (or uses a local version if you want to use that) and compares the recommended ASD settings to those in your own Intune environment. Note, the script makes NO CHANGES to your environment, it simply reads the current settings.

It then produces the console output you see above and a HTML report like this:

Screenshot 2025-11-19 101937

You can refer to this page I also created:

https://github.com/directorcia/bp/wiki/indows-Compliance-Policy-Settings-%E2%80%90-Security-Rationale

as to why these settings are important to the security of your M365 environment.

Look out for more scripts like this coming soon. I welcome any suggestion about improving this.