Category: Microsoft 365

Need to Know podcast–Episode 364

A weekly roundup of Microsoft Cloud news with a focus on SMBs. Key topics include Microsoft’s internal testing of an always-on AI assistant, major security threats such as Russian state-sponsored router hijacking and advanced phishing attacks, updates to Microsoft Teams, and a retrospective on SharePoint’s evolution. Robert also discusses the challenges and strategies for adopting AI in business, emphasizing the need for a unified, collaborative approach to AI usage within organizations.

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Show notes

Microsoft tests ‘ClawPilot’ AI agent for 3,000 staff

SOHO router compromise leads to DNS hijacking and adversary-in-the-middle attacks

What’s New in Microsoft Teams | April 2026

ClickFix campaign uses fake macOS utilities lures to deliver infostealers

The Future of SharePoint

Breaking the code: Multi-stage ‘code of conduct’ phishing campaign leads to AiTM token compromise

Tuning Safe Links and Safe Attachments in Defender for Office 365 Without Breaking Your Tenant

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If you’re running M365 Business Premium for clients, Safe Links and Safe Attachments are already doing work — whether you configured them or not. The Built-in protection preset applies to every mailbox the moment Defender for Office 365 is licensed. The question isn’t “is it on?” — it’s “is it tuned for the way your client actually receives mail?” Out of the box, it’s closer to a safety net than a security control.

Prerequisites MSPs skip

Before you touch a single policy, confirm three things. First, mail has to flow through Exchange Online Protection. Hybrid tenants with a third-party gateway in front (Mimecast, Proofpoint, anything rewriting URLs) will often cause Safe Links to skip wrapping — Microsoft explicitly warns that pre-wrapping can prevent Safe Links from processing the link at all. Second, confirm licensing: Safe Links and Safe Attachments require Defender for Office 365 Plan 1 (included in Business Premium). Plan 2 features (Safe Documents, Threat Explorer real-time detections) need separate entitlement. Third, set quarantine notifications up before you tighten policies — users need end-user spam notifications or a quarantine policy with access enabled, or your service desk gets the entire phishing queue.

Where to configure — Standard preset, not custom, 90% of the time

The Microsoft Defender portal is your canonical surface: security.microsoft.com → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies. From there:

  • Preset security policies for 90% of clients. Enable Standard, assign to all recipients by domain.

  • Safe Links and Safe Attachments tiles are for custom policies — only use them when a specific user group needs different behaviour (execs on Strict, a lab OU excluded, etc.).

  • Configuration analyzer — this is the tile most MSPs never click. It diffs your current policies against Standard and Strict baselines and flags every setting that’s weaker than Microsoft’s recommendation.

Microsoft’s own guidance is explicit: prefer presets over custom policies. See Set up Safe Links policies and Set up Safe Attachments policies.

The rollout pattern that actually works

Don’t flip Strict on Monday morning. Use a three-ring rollout:

  1. Ring 1 — IT and security-aware staff (week 1). Assign Standard preset. Watch quarantine, false-positive submissions, and user complaints. This ring tolerates noise.

  2. Ring 2 — a tolerant business unit (week 2–3). Finance is usually a bad pilot (high-volume invoices with wrapped URLs confuse people). Pick sales ops, marketing, or IT-adjacent teams.

  3. Ring 3 — everyone else (week 4+). By now you have a real signal on which domains need Tenant Allow/Block entries.

For Strict preset, add a fourth ring limited to exec and finance groups — or leave it off. Strict’s aggressive bulk thresholds (BCL 4) will blow up newsletters and marketing workflows. Details at Preset security policies.

Top three pitfalls

1. Custom policies silently overriding presets. Preset security policies have the highest priority except when a custom policy explicitly targets the same user. If you inherited a tenant with a custom Safe Links policy from 2019 that says AllowClickThrough = true, it beats your shiny new Standard preset. Audit first: open every existing policy before assigning presets.

2. Over-allowlisting domains. Every entry in “Do not rewrite the following URLs” is a permanent click-through exception. Treat it like firewall rules — justify, document, review annually. A forgotten *.sharepointdomain.com wildcard is how payloads land.

3. Ignoring the Configuration analyzer. Run it quarterly. Tenants drift: an admin raises a threshold to silence a complaint, nobody reverses it, six months later the baseline is gone. The Configuration analyzer surfaces this in one screen.

Tune deliberately, measure through Threat Explorer, and treat preset policies as your default — the time to build a custom policy is when you can describe exactly which preset setting it’s overriding and why.

A Great Product Scales. A Great System Scales. But Leaders Multiply.

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Most MSPs I talk to are chasing scale.

More endpoints. More seats. More tools. More revenue per engineer.

And that makes sense—up to a point.

But here’s the uncomfortable truth: products scale. Systems scale. Dashboards scale. Yet the thing that actually determines whether an MSP breaks through the next ceiling isn’t any of those.

It’s leadership.

In particular, whether you’re multiplying your people—or slowly becoming the bottleneck without realising it.

The Hidden Scaling Problem in Many MSPs

I see this pattern constantly.

The MSP owner is sharp. Knows the stack inside out. Answers client questions quickly. Fixes problems fast. Reviews every proposal. Tweaks every process.

On the surface, it looks like control. Underneath, it’s fragile.

Because when knowledge, judgement, and decision‑making live in one or two heads, the business doesn’t really scale—it stretches. And stretched systems eventually snap.

This is where Microsoft 365 Copilot genuinely changes the conversation—not because it “does AI”, but because it shifts who can think, decide, and act with confidence.

Copilot Isn’t About Speed. It’s About Trust.

When I work with MSP teams implementing Copilot properly, the biggest change isn’t faster emails or prettier documents.

It’s trust.

A junior engineer can review a complex email thread and ask Copilot to summarise what actually matters—before responding to a client.

A service manager can draft options for a tricky renewal conversation without escalating every time.

An account manager can walk into a QBR already across usage, risks, and open issues—without waiting for someone else to spoon‑feed them.

That’s not automation. That’s capability transfer.

Instead of leaders being the thinking engine for the business, Copilot becomes a quiet amplifier that helps the team think better on their own.

Systems Scale. Leaders Multiply.

Here’s the distinction I think too many MSPs miss.

Systems help people follow rules. Leaders help people exercise judgement.

Copilot sits squarely in the second category—if you use it intentionally.

I’ve seen MSPs roll it out as “another tool” and get negligible value. Everyone plays with prompts for a week, then goes back to old habits.

The MSPs getting real results are doing something different: they’re pouring into their people.

They’re teaching staff how to reason through problems using Copilot as a second brain. How to sanity‑check assumptions. How to prepare before asking for help instead of defaulting to escalation.

That’s leadership multiplication.

And it compounds faster than any new tool rollout ever will.

What This Means for MSP Owners

If you’re serious about scaling, the question isn’t “Have we deployed Copilot?”

It’s:

  • Are my people making better decisions without me?

  • Are conversations getting clearer, not noisier?

  • Are we reducing dependency on tribal knowledge?

Copilot won’t fix weak leadership. But in the hands of leaders who invest time, context, and expectation into their teams, it accelerates growth in ways traditional systems never could.

The Return Might Surprise You

Here’s what tends to happen when MSP leaders commit to developing people—not just installing tools.

Fewer interruptions. Faster client responses without panic. Better internal conversations. More confidence across the business.

And eventually, something even more valuable: space.

Space to think strategically instead of reactively. Space to focus on the business instead of being trapped inside it.

So yes—great products scale. Great systems scale.

But if you want an MSP that genuinely grows without breaking, keep pouring into your team.

That return doesn’t just surprise you.

It changes everything.

Shipping Intune App Protection Policies for BYOD: What Actually Works in Production

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App Protection Policies (APP, sometimes called MAM) are the single highest-ROI control in Business Premium for BYOD. You get corporate data containerisation on an unenrolled iPhone or Android device in about an afternoon — if you avoid the usual landmines. Here’s the pattern I ship to MSP clients.

Prerequisites people miss

APP only protects apps that implement the Intune App SDK (Outlook, Teams, Word, Edge, OneDrive, etc.). That’s most of M365, but not every third-party app the user loves. Before you touch a policy:

  • Every targeted user must have an Intune Plan 1 licence (bundled in Business Premium and the E3/E5 stack).

  • Company Portal must be installed on Android. iOS doesn’t strictly need it for MAM-WE (without enrolment), but Authenticator is required for sign-in brokering.

  • For Android, you need the Play Integrity verdict configured if you plan to block rooted devices — and Play Store access, which rules out many China-market devices.

  • Decide now whether you’ll pair APP with a Conditional Access grant of Require app protection policy. If yes, your CA policy needs to exclude break-glass accounts and any service accounts that hit Graph from mobile.

See the App protection policies overview for the full support matrix.

Where to configure

Everything lives in the Microsoft Intune admin center at intune.microsoft.com:

  • Apps → App protection policies → Create policy → pick iOS/iPadOS or Android. You create one policy per platform.

  • Target apps: start with “Selected apps” and pick the core Microsoft apps. Do not start with “All Microsoft Apps” — you’ll regret it the first time Teams Rooms or a hybrid meeting app trips the policy.

  • Data protection settings: align with Microsoft’s Level 2 enterprise enhanced framework as your default. Level 1 is too loose for anyone storing client data; Level 3 breaks copy/paste workflows most SMBs rely on.

  • Access requirements: PIN of 6 digits, biometric allowed, 30-minute offline grace.

  • Conditional launch: jailbreak/root = Block access, min OS version = current−1, max PIN attempts = 5 → Wipe data. Full reference at Conditional launch actions.

The rollout pattern that actually works

Three rings, two weeks each, no exceptions:

  1. Ring 0 — IT and champions (5–10 users). Assign to a dynamic security group. Set Conditional launch actions to Warn, not Block. Let it bake. You are looking for app conflicts, not policy correctness.

  2. Ring 1 — Pilot department (25–50 users). Flip conditional launch to Block. Enable CA “require app protection policy” in report-only mode. Watch sign-in logs for a week — you will find the one user still using the native iOS Mail app.

  3. Ring 2 — Everyone. Move CA to On. Decommission any “allow legacy auth” exceptions at the same time — clients will push back, hold the line.

Use assignment filters (not separate groups) to carve out corporate-owned devices from BYOD rules. It scales; groups don’t.

The three pitfalls that bite

1. Policy conflicts silently pick the most restrictive value. If a user is in two groups with different PIN lengths, they get the longer one — and no error surfaces. Run one policy per platform per persona. Document which group wins.

2. Selective wipe isn’t device wipe. Apps → App selective wipe removes corporate data from managed apps only — photos, personal iMessages, the user’s Spotify library all stay. Train your service desk to say this out loud when an employee leaves. Also: the wipe only fires the next time the user opens the app, and can take 30 minutes.

3. Conditional launch “Min OS version” will brick users overnight. When Apple ships iOS 19 and you’ve set “Min OS version = 18”, a user on 17 walks in on Monday and can’t open Outlook. Always pair Min OS version with a Warn action first, run it for a fortnight, then escalate to Block.

Get these three right and APP is genuinely boring — which, for mobile security, is exactly what you want.

Self-Service Password Reset with writeback: the rollout that doesn’t burn your helpdesk

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SSPR is a box most MSPs tick on day one of a Business Premium tenant and then never look at again. That’s fine until a hybrid customer calls because Karen changed her password on My Sign-Ins, logged into her domain-joined laptop, and got rejected. SSPR without writeback is half a feature. Here’s how to deploy the whole thing properly.

Prerequisites people miss

The obvious ones — an Entra ID P1 license (included in Business Premium) and either Entra Connect Sync or Entra Connect Cloud Sync — aren’t where rollouts die. The misses are:

  • On-prem AD permissions for the sync account. The account running Connect (or the Cloud Sync provisioning agent) needs Reset password, Change password, Write lockoutTime, and Write pwdLastSet on the user OUs. The Connect wizard grants these if you let it; locked-down AD environments often don’t. Writeback fails silently if these are missing.

  • A matching on-prem password policy. Entra enforces its own complexity rules. If your on-prem policy is stricter (minimum length, history, banned words), a user’s new cloud password will be rejected by AD when it writes back, and the user will see a generic error. Align them before you enable, not after.

  • Combined registration actually enabled and enforced. Legacy SSPR-only registration still exists in old tenants. If users register methods for MFA but not SSPR, the reset flow blocks them.

See Microsoft’s writeback concept doc for the full supported-operations list: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-sspr-writeback(opens in new window).

Where to configure it

Everything is in the Entra admin centre — no PowerShell required for a standard deploy.

The rollout pattern that works

Don’t flip it on tenant-wide. The pattern that doesn’t generate tickets:

  1. Pilot group of ~10 — IT plus two friendly business users. Scope SSPR to that group only. Verify a reset from My Sign-Ins actually lands in AD (pwdLastSet on the DC is your proof).

  2. Registration campaign to the pilot for 14 days. Force them through combined registration. Watch the Registration report for stragglers.

  3. Broaden by department, not by “All users.” Finance first, then ops, then field staff. Each wave gets the campaign a week before the SSPR scope flips.

  4. Protect the registration step with Conditional Access. Use Register security information as the user action and require MFA (or a Temporary Access Pass for new starters): https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-all-users-security-info-registration(opens in new window). Without this, an attacker who phishes a password can register their own MFA method and own the account.

Top pitfalls

  1. Admins can’t use SSPR the same way users can. Privileged roles are locked to strong methods and can’t rely on Security Questions. Test with an admin-tier account before you cut over — and keep a break-glass account that is explicitly excluded from the CA registration policy.

  2. Writeback “works” but the user still can’t log in. Nine times out of ten this is cached credentials on a domain-joined laptop that hasn’t seen a DC since the reset. Tell the user to connect to the corporate network or VPN and lock/unlock. Bake this into your helpdesk script.

  3. Cloud Sync vs Connect Sync confusion. You can run them side-by-side, but writeback must be enabled on whichever one syncs that user’s domain. Audit first — we’ve seen tenants with both running where writeback was enabled on the wrong one and nobody noticed until a reset failed.

Enable it properly once, and SSPR moves from a compliance checkbox to a real helpdesk-deflection tool.

A Cleaner Way to Connect PowerShell to Exchange Online

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If you still rely on Connect-ExchangeOnline with a username, password, and an MFA prompt, you already know the pain. Scripts break overnight. Scheduled tasks fail when a token expires. Service accounts get flagged by conditional access. And the moment someone enables MFA on the admin account you’ve been quietly using, your automation falls over.

I’ve been written a new script —

https://github.com/directorcia/Office365/blob/master/o365-connect-exo-cert.ps1

with full documentation here:

https://github.com/directorcia/Office365/wiki/Connect-to-Exchange-Online-with-Certificates

— that swaps all of that for certificate-based app authentication. There’s nothing exotic about the underlying approach; Microsoft has supported it for years. What’s been missing is a clean, one-shot way to set it up without spending an afternoon clicking through the Entra portal. That’s what this script gives me, and I think it earns its place in any MSP’s toolkit.

What the Script Actually Does

There are two modes, controlled by switches.

-GenerateLocalCertificate creates a self-signed RSA-2048 certificate in your current user’s certificate store, exports the public key as a .cer file, and optionally exports a password-protected .pfx. By default it’s valid for two years. That’s the local side of the handshake.

-UseCertificateAuth is the everyday mode. You tell it which tenant to connect to — or let it look up the details in a profile map file — and it signs into Exchange Online using that certificate. No password. No browser. No MFA dialog.

The clever bit is the third option: combining -GenerateLocalCertificate with -ProvisionEntraApp -Tenant 'contoso.onmicrosoft.com'. In a single run, the script will generate the local certificate, authenticate to Microsoft Graph via a device-code flow, create the Entra ID app registration if it doesn’t exist, upload the certificate, grant Exchange.ManageAsApp and Application.Read.All with admin consent, create the matching service principal, sign you into Exchange Online to add the app to the Organization Management role group, and save the tenant, app ID, and certificate thumbprint to a JSON profile file so future connections don’t need any of those parameters.

That’s a job that normally takes twenty minutes of clicking, copying GUIDs, and second-guessing whether the right role got assigned. The script does it in about ninety seconds.

Getting Started

If you’re new to certificate auth, the first run is the one that matters. Drop the script onto an admin machine, open PowerShell, and run:

.\o365-connect-exo-cert.ps1 -GenerateLocalCertificate -ProvisionEntraApp -Tenant 'yourtenant.onmicrosoft.com'

You’ll be prompted to sign in twice — once via device code for the Graph permissions (which if you use the –copydevicecodetoclipboard, option will put the required device code straight into the clipboard to paste into the request), then again with Connect-ExchangeOnline so the script can add the app to the role group. Both need a Global Admin account. After that, every future run is just:

.\o365-connect-exo-cert.ps1 -UseCertificateAuth -Tenant 'yourtenant.onmicrosoft.com'

No prompts. No browser. The script reads the tenant, app ID, and thumbprint from o365-exo-cert-auth.json (saved to parent directory), finds the certificate in your local store, builds a signed JWT, and you’re in. One caveat worth flagging: when you’ve just provisioned a brand-new app, give it fifteen to thirty minutes for role assignments to replicate before you try to connect. The script warns about this in its output, but it’s the single most common reason a fresh setup looks broken when it isn’t.

If you’re managing more than one tenant, the profile file is where this really earns its keep. Each provisioning run appends or updates an entry, so you can ask for a connection by -ProfileName, -Tenant, or -Organization and the script picks the right credentials. When several profiles match, it lists them and lets you choose.

Why Certificates Beat Passwords

The security argument is the easy one. A certificate’s private key never leaves the machine that generated it. Nothing crosses the wire that an attacker could intercept and replay. There’s no shared secret to rotate across a team, no admin password sitting in a vault that someone might extract, and no MFA bypass to engineer because the flow doesn’t involve a user account at all.

Permissions are scoped too. The app holds only Exchange.ManageAsApp and read-only access to application metadata. If the certificate is ever compromised, you remove the key credential from the app registration and the access is gone — no password reset required, no impact on any human admin account.

The script enforces TLS 1.2, refuses to assign RBAC if the EXO session has landed in the wrong tenant, warns when the certificate is within thirty days of expiry, and keeps the device-code value off the clipboard by default to avoid leaks on RDP or shared sessions. Small things, but they add up.

Why It’s a Win for Automation

Certificate auth is what makes unattended Exchange Online work actually unattended. A scheduled task running at 2 a.m. doesn’t have a human to click “Approve” on an MFA prompt. With this approach, you point Task Scheduler at the script with -noprompt, pass the tenant, and walk away.

For an MSP, that becomes a per-tenant capability rather than a per-admin one. One profile file, one shared script, separate certificates per tenant or per admin machine — and now mailbox audits, distribution group cleanup, shared mailbox provisioning, and any of the other recurring chores you keep meaning to automate can run on a timer instead of waiting for a quiet Friday afternoon. Pair it with a Power Automate flow or a daily Copilot summary in Teams, and you’ve got reporting that lands in front of the right people without anyone signing in.

Where I’d Take It Next

If you’ve never moved off interactive sign-in for Exchange Online, this is the path I’d take. Spend half an hour standing it up against a test tenant. Get comfortable with the profile file. Then start moving your scheduled work over, one job at a time. The shift from “who’s signing in?” to “which certificate is presenting itself?” is a quiet one, but once your automation stops breaking every time an admin’s MFA settings change, you won’t go back.

Your Conditional Access Is Stuck in 2018

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You get a phone call from a client one Sunday morning in February. One of their bookkeepers had clicked an invoice link the previous Friday afternoon, signed in like normal, and gone home for the weekend. By Monday, the attacker had set up an inbox rule, watched a fortnight of email traffic, and sent a payment-redirect note to a supplier — from the bookkeeper’s actual mailbox. Eighty thousand dollars walked out the door before anyone noticed the wire details had quietly changed.

The tenant had MFA enforced. It had a Conditional Access policy. It had cyber insurance, renewed in January on the strength of those two things. None of that mattered.

The attack moved. The configuration didn’t.

Adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits don’t try to beat the MFA prompt anymore. They wait for the user to complete it, then steal the session token and replay it from somewhere else. Microsoft’s threat intel team disclosed an April campaign that hit thirty-five thousand users across thirteen thousand organisations in twenty-six countries — a single month, a single operator. Every one of those users had MFA. None of them had session controls tuned to actually defend the session.

This is the bit MSPs need to sit with. Conditional Access in Entra was never built as an MFA tickbox. It is the session control surface — the place where you decide what a signed-in user can do, from where, on what device, for how long. The grant and session controls in that same blade — the ones most SMB tenants have never opened — are what break this attack. We have spent five years building a defence for 2018 and leaving it deployed in 2026.

Four switches, all in the same blade

There are four controls inside Conditional Access that meaningfully change the outcome of a token theft, and most Business Premium tenants pay for all of them and use none.

  • Sign-In Frequency, set deliberately rather than left at its sliding ninety-day default, collapses the lifetime of a stolen token. Most tenants I look at have it set backwards — managed users get prompted constantly while unmanaged sessions ride for weeks.
  • Require-compliant-device on Exchange Online forces the attacker’s browser session to fail at the grant, not the prompt.
  • Phishing-resistant authentication strength — passkeys, FIDO2, Windows Hello — closes off the credential path to begin with.
  • Token Protection, even in report-only on Windows native apps, gives you the telemetry to spot a session being replayed from a country your user has never visited.

None of this is theoretical. Microsoft auto-rolled Conditional Access into more than half a million tenants in late 2023 specifically because tenants were not configuring it themselves. That auto-rollout sets the floor. The four controls above sit above the floor, and they are the ones that change the renewal conversation with your insurer.

The unit economics finally work

The honest reason most MSPs haven’t retuned their CA baseline is that per-tenant identity work used to be uneconomic. That changed. With GDAP and Microsoft Lighthouse, an MSP can review CA policy, push report-only changes, and watch sign-in telemetry across every client tenant from one pane. Pair that with a Loop page or a Teams channel for your security pod and the review cadence stops being a heroics exercise.

The bookkeeper followed her training to the letter. What let her down was a tenant configured for the threat landscape we had four years ago. When the next breach lands in one of your tenants, it will not be the MFA prompt that failed. It will be the session controls nobody touched. That is where the work is now.

Windows Hello for Business: Pick Cloud Kerberos Trust and Move On

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Every few weeks I get a question from an MSP engineer that starts with some version of “we’re about to roll out Windows Hello for Business — key trust or cloud trust?” My answer has been the same for a couple of years now, but the question keeps coming because the documentation is sprawling and the old hybrid PKI diagrams still haunt everyone who deployed WHfB before 2022. If you have a hybrid Active Directory and a Business Premium tenant, you should be on cloud Kerberos trust. Full stop. Everything else is legacy baggage.

The prerequisites people still miss

Microsoft’s own planning guide is the source of truth, but two prereqs catch MSPs out every time.

First, domain controllers. Cloud Kerberos trust needs Windows Server 2016 or later DCs, fully patched, and you need enough read-write DCs in every AD site where users will authenticate. If your branch office has one creaky 2012 R2 box left, the sign-in will fail in ways that look like network issues and waste a day of your life.

Second, Microsoft Entra Kerberos has to be explicitly enabled against the on-prem domain. It’s not on by default. Skip it and users will provision a PIN happily, then fail to reach on-prem file shares the first time they try. The cloud Kerberos trust deployment guide walks through enabling it.

Where to configure it

For greenfield Autopilot tenants, the fastest path is the Intune tenant-wide enrolment policy at Intune admin center → Devices → Enrolment → Windows → Windows Hello for Business. Set it to Enabled and configure the defaults there. That covers OOBE.

For everything else, build an explicit Account Protection policy at Intune admin center → Endpoint security → Account protection → Create Policy → Windows → Account protection → Windows Hello for Business. This is the one you target at device groups for staged rollout. Microsoft’s tenant-wide policy guide explains the precedence rules; read it before you layer policies.

A rollout pattern that survives contact with users

I run three rings and I don’t apologise for how boring it looks.

Ring 1: five to ten IT-adjacent devices for two weeks. You’re looking for PIN provisioning completion and on-prem resource access — not for smiles.

Ring 2: one full business unit, minimum fifty devices, two to three weeks. This is where you catch VPN quirks, smartcard reader conflicts, and the one shared PC nobody told you about.

Ring 3: the rest of the fleet, staged over a fortnight by device group, not by user.

Stage by device, not by user, because Windows Hello is a per-device-per-user credential. Chasing user groups creates a weird matrix where someone’s laptop prompts for a PIN but their desktop doesn’t, and the helpdesk gets blamed for inconsistency.

The pitfalls that burn you

Rolling back is worse than rolling forward. Disabling the policy doesn’t remove provisioned PINs; it just stops new ones. Plan the forward path before you enable it.

Don’t mix trust types. If you have leftover key trust policy from an old deployment, retire it before enabling cloud Kerberos trust on the same fleet. The hybrid key trust guide is still published, and Microsoft explicitly recommends against key trust for new deployments — pay attention to that.

Shared and kiosk devices need explicit exclusions. WHfB binds a credential to a user-device pair, which is exactly wrong for a front-desk PC logged in as five different people a day. Use Intune filters to carve those devices out of the policy.

Get the prerequisites right, pick cloud Kerberos trust, ring it, and Windows Hello becomes the quietest part of your security stack. Which is what you want.